ASYLUM LAW’S GENDER PARADOX
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INTRODUCTION
From the moment Rodi Alvarado Pena married a Guatemalan
army officer at the age of 16, she was subjected to intensive abuse,
and all her efforts to get help were unsuccessful. Her husband
raped her repeatedly, attempted to abort their second child by
kicking her in the spine, dislocated her jaw, tried to cut off her
hands with a machete, kicked her in the vagina and used her
head to break windows. He terrified her by bragging about his
power to kill innocent civilians with impunity. Even though many
of the attacks took place in public, police failed to help her in any
way. After she made out a complaint, her husband ignored three
1
citations without consequence.

In 1999, the United States denied asylum to the Guatemalan
woman who survived these torturous acts and escaped to the North
2
3
seeking refuge. The panel of asylum judges in In re R-A- reasoned
that Rodi Alvarado was ineligible for refugee protection because the
abuse she suffered resulted from personal circumstances that lacked
4
larger societal relevance.
Six years earlier, the United States denied asylum in the case of
an Iranian woman fearing persecution for her opposition to the
5
government’s restrictions on women. A court ruled that the woman
did not present a particularized asylum claim because it could not
distinguish her circumstances from Iran’s general mistreatment of
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AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS: TORTURE AND ILLTREATMENT OF WOMEN 23 (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.stoptorture.org. (last
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accompanying text.
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See id. at 915-920.
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Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993).
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6

women.
These stories illustrate the paradox faced by victims of gender
7
persecution who seek refuge in the United States: without a category
of asylum protection based on gender, women confront contradictory
conceptions of their experiences as either too narrow or too broad to
qualify them as refugees. This Comment analyzes the unique burden
imposed on female asylum applicants to fit their claims within this
circumscribed notion of a refugee. The focus of this analysis is the
8
“R-A- rule,” an Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)
proposal, promulgated in direct response to the Alvarado case which
epitomizes asylum law’s paradoxical treatment of gender-based
asylum claims.
At the time of this Comment’s publication, the “R-A- rule”
remains a proposal, more than a year and a half after its initial
9
proposition. In fact, it is possible that the INS may never adopt this
10
proposed rule. Regardless of its ultimate fate, however, a critique of
the “R-A- rule’s” underlying assumptions and of its contradictory
demands on female asylum applicants serves as an important gauge
of the INS’s perception of gender-based asylum claims at a critical
moment. While gender-based human rights abuses continue world11
wide, the United Nations, in its most definitive terms to date, has

6

Id. at 1243 n.12 (reasoning that “the petitioner had not shown that she and the
other members of her group would be persecuted but only that they would be
subjected to ‘the same restrictions and regulations applicable to the Iranian
population in general’”) (citation omitted).
7
This Comment considers gender persecution, acts of violence against women
perpetrated because of the persecutor’s bias or animus toward women. While a
persecutor’s motivation is a legal conclusion to be proven by an asylum applicant,
this Comment considers rape, forced prostitution, domestic violence, female genital
mutilation, dowry deaths, and honor killing to be prime examples of gender
persecution. For an enumeration and discussion of the common physical, sexual,
and psychological forms of gender-based violence, see United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Prevention and Response to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
in Refugee Situations 1, 5 U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/67 (Mar. 2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home [hereinafter “UNHCR, Sexual and
Gender-Based Violence”].
8
In accordance with administrative procedure for implementing new
regulations, the INS published the proposed rule in the Federal Register along with
commentary explaining its purpose and reasoning. See Asylum and Withholding
Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
pt. 208). In press materials announcing the proposed rule, the INS termed the
proposal the “R-A- rule.” See Questions and Answers, The R-A- Rule (Dec. 7, 2000), at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/questsans/RARule.htm (last visited Aug.
16, 2002) (on file with author).
9
See 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,597-76,598.
10
See Morgan, infra note 110.
11
See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1.
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made clear that states should consider gender-based persecution a
12
basis for asylum.
Because of its lack of a guarantee that women
persecuted because of their gender have equal access to refuge, the
proposed rule exposes an enduring gender paradox in U.S. asylum
law.
The promulgation of the INS proposal followed two conflicting
decisions by asylum adjudicators in the Alvarado case.
An
immigration judge first agreed with Alvarado that she had been
persecuted on account of her “membership in a particular social
group,” specifically, “Guatemalan women who have been involved
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that
13
women are to live under male domination.”
The Board of
14
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in In re R-A-, however, reversed the
judge’s decision and held that Alvarado failed to establish
persecution based on her membership in a cognizable “social group”
15
under the asylum statute. Alvarado appealed the decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which stayed
the decision to allow for review by the United States Attorney
16
General.
A month before the Attorney General’s eleventh-hour
ruling, the INS proposed the “R-A- rule” in direct response to the
17
BIA’s decision in the Alvarado case. The INS explained its proposal
as an attempt to clarify the interpretation of asylum cases “with more
varied bases . . . [such as] an applicant’s gender or sexual
18
orientation.”
In one of her final acts in office, in January 2001,
Attorney General Janet Reno vacated the BIA decision and remanded

12

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees recently published new
guidelines on the protection of refugee women that state, “[e]ven though gender is
not specifically referenced in the refugee definition, it is widely accepted that it can
influence or dictate, the type of persecution or harms suffered and the reasons for
this treatment.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on
International Protection: Gender Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1(A)(2) of
the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 6, U.N.
Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (2002) [hereinafter “2002 UN Gender Guidelines”].
13
Matter of Rodi Alvarado Pena (Immgr. Ct. Sept. 20, 1996), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/caselaw/ij/alvarado-ij.html (on file with author).
14
22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999).
15
Id. at 914.
16
Order of Stay in Rodi Alvarado Pena v. INS, No. 99-70823 (9th Cir. June 8,
2000), available at http://www.uchastings.edu (last visited Aug. 30, 2002) (on file
with author).
17
Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7,
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). The INS explicitly noted that the
proposed definitions are “intended to address analytical issues that have arisen in the
context of some claims based on domestic violence, and in particular in the Board’s
decision in In re R-A-.” Id. (citation omitted).
18
Id. at 76,589.
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the case for determination in accordance with the finalized version of
19
the proposed INS rule.
The requirements for qualifying as a refugee consist of three
20
essential elements: (1) an applicant must have a well-founded fear
21
of persecution, which requires state action; (2) the applicant must
possess one or more of five protected characteristics: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion; and (3) the applicant must have been or will be persecuted
22
on account of that characteristic. The proposed rule addresses the
meaning of three particular components of the refugee definition:
“persecution,” “on account of,” and “membership in a particular
23
social group.”
With respect to “persecution,” the proposed rule reaffirms that
the relevant government must be responsible for the applicant’s past
24
harm and suffering, or fear of future harm or suffering.
The
proposed language, however, makes clear that persecution may also
be imputed to a government when an individual or group persecutes
an applicant and the relevant government “is unwilling or unable to

19

Matter of Rodi Alvarado Pena, Att’y Gen. Order 2379-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001),
available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/documents/legal/ag_ra_order.pdf (last
visited Aug. 30, 2002) (on file with author); see also Susan Sachs, Reno Voids Denial of
Asylum for Guatemalan Battered Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at B4.
20
The Refugee Act defines a refugee as:
[a]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
21
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,597 (“Inherent in the meaning of the term persecution is
that the serious harm or suffering that an applicant experienced or fears must be
inflicted by the government of the country of persecution or by a person or group
that the government is unwilling or unable to control.”).
22
See INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
23
See 65 Fed. Reg. 76,597-76,598 (2000). The current INS regulations do not
provide definitions nor explanations for these terms. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.15.
24
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,597.
In addition, the proposed rule sets forth
considerations for asylum judges to evaluate in determining whether a government is
unable to control the persecution or whether it is unwilling to intervene. Id. In
interpreting whether the government has taken any reasonable steps to control the
conduct and whether reasonable access to state protection exists, the proposed rule
states that judges “may” consider a list of seven sources of evidence, which include
“government complicity” in relation to the harm, “a pattern of government
unresponsiveness,” and “general country conditions.” Id.
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25

control” the conduct. With respect to the meaning of the term “on
account of,” the rule would impose a new, higher burden, requiring
not only that an applicant establish her persecutor’s motivation, but
also that this motivation be central to the persecutor’s motivation to
26
act. In addition, the rule clarifies that, although relevant, the “on
account of” inquiry does not require evidence that a persecutor seeks
to harm other individuals with the applicant’s protected
27
characteristic.
Ironically, the rule contradicts this clarification by
suggesting that motive may not be ascertainable without evidence
28
related to the societal significance of the abuse.
Finally, the
regulation proposes a two-step test for determining the meaning of
29
“membership in a particular social group.” First, a “social group”
30
must consist of members with a common, immutable characteristic.
Having found an immutable trait, a judge may then consider the
31
extent to which the group is cohesive and societally-recognized.
Persecution based on one’s “membership in a particular social
group” is the least clearly defined of the five categories of refugee
32
protection. In spite of its ambiguity, the “social group” category is
vital for female asylum applicants persecuted on account of their
33
gender. Because the asylum statute does not include gender as a
34
victims of gender-based
category of cognizable persecution,
persecution must frequently rely on the “social group” ground when
35
seeking asylum. Thus, the contribution of the proposed INS rule to
the analysis of gender-based claims hinges on the scope and meaning
of persecution on account of “membership in a particular social

25

Id.
Id.
27
Id. at 76,597-76,598.
28
See infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
29
See 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,598; see also discussion infra PART III.F.
30
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,598.
31
See infra notes 252-58.
32
Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Considerations For
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Claims From Women 1 (May 26, 1995), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/guidelines/guidelines_us.pdf (on file with
author) [hereinafter “INS Guidelines”]; see also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d at 1239 (3d Cir.
1993) (discussing the sparse legislative history with respect to the meaning and scope
of the “social group” category).
33
See Lydia Brashear Tiede, Battered Immigrant Women and Immigration Remedies:
Are the Standards Too High?, 28 HUM. RTS. 21 (2001) (noting the absence of a genderspecific category in the refugee definition and the resulting tendency of women to
rely on the “membership in particular social group” and “political opinion” theories
in gender-based asylum claims).
34
See INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
35
See Brashear Tiede, supra note 33.
26
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36

group.”
Although the proposed rule attempts to clarify the meaning of
“refugee” and to improve asylum analysis for victims of domestic
37
violence, the rule falls short of these objectives. First, by inserting
the new centrality requirement into the “on account of” analysis, the
proposal adds a new hurdle into women’s difficult task of proving
38
their persecutors’ motives.
Second, rather than refining the
interpretation of “social group,” the rule confounds its meaning by
providing discretionary factors for judges to consider even when
women establish persecution on account of the immutable trait of
39
gender.
In short, by failing to ensure that asylum adjudicators
consider the persecution of women based on their gender a sufficient
40
basis for asylum, the rule does little to improve persecuted women’s
access to refuge. In fact, the rule promotes the gender paradox, by
requiring that a “social group” be more particularized than gender
41
42
alone, but still possess societally significant breadth and cohesion.
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of gender-based
asylum analysis in the United States, leading up to Attorney General
Reno’s final day in office in January 2001. Part II summarizes the
proposed “R-A- rule” and Part III critiques it, addressing its creation
of a more demanding standard for establishing “persecution on
account of membership in a particular social group.” Part IV
evaluates the asylum paradox faced by female claimants. This section
argues that the United States must end the disparate treatment of
victims of gender persecution by eliminating the contradictory view
of women’s persecutory experiences as either too pandemic or too
personal or domestic in nature to warrant refugee protection. This
Comment concludes that the most effective and appropriate manner
of preventing the paradoxical treatment of gender-based asylum

36

For a discussion of the INS’s treatment of “social group” within the proposed
“R-A- rule,” see infra PART III.F.
37
INS News Release, Proposed Rule Issued for Gender-Based Asylum Claims
(Dec. 7, 2002), available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov (on file with author).
38
See infra PART III.D & III.E.
39
See infra PART III.F.
40
In the Federal Register summary, the INS proposal “restates that gender can
form the basis of a particular social group.” Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65
Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
However, because the rule’s proposed two-step analysis of “social group” claims
allows judges to deny asylum in situations where a woman establishes persecution
based on her immutable trait of gender, the Federal Register statement is merely
aspirational. For a discussion of the two-pronged “social group” analysis proposed by
the INS, see infra PART III.F.
41
See infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
42
See infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
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claims is an amendment to the refugee statute that recognizes
persecution on account of gender as an independent ground for
asylum.
I. THE HISTORY OF GENDER PERSECUTION AS A BASIS FOR ASYLUM
A. The Refugee Treaty
July 2001 marked the 50th Anniversary of the most important
43
document promoting the welfare of refugees around the world: the
44
1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees. As of August 8,
45
2002, 141 countries have become parties to this treaty and have
accepted its obligations to protect refugees whose “freedom would be
threatened on account of [their] race, religion, nationality,
46
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
Although not a party to the original treaty, the United States is
among 139 countries that have signed on to the 1967 Protocol on the
47
Status of Refugees (“Protocol”).
The Protocol incorporated the
Refugee Convention, eliminated its temporal limitations, and
48
extended its geographic coverage beyond Europe. It was not until
49
Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, which codified the
Convention’s definition of refugee and nearly all of its other
50
provisions, that the United States formalized a process by which
persons could seek protection under the Protocol within the United
51
States.
Because the Refugee Convention provides the framework
for whether foreigners seeking asylum in this country will be granted

43

See, e.g., Thomas David Jones, A Human Rights Tragedy: The Cuban and Haitian
Refugee Crises Revisited, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 479, 480 (1995).
44
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
(adopted July 28, 1951), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/1951convention/index.html
[hereinafter “Refugee Convention”].
45
UNHCR, State Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home [hereinafter “State Parties to the 1951 Convention”] (on file
with author).
46
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, art. 33 (1967),
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home [hereinafter “1967
Protocol”].
47
State Parties to the 1951 Convention, supra note 45.
48
See 1967 Protocol, supra note 46, at arts. I(2), (3).
49
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 107 (1980) (codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
50
Id. The Convention’s definition of refugee is now a part of the INA and has
been implemented by the regulations of the INS. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8
C.F.R. § 208.15.
51
RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 8:1 (2d ed. 2001).
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52

refuge, to examine the treatment of women under U.S. asylum law,
one must first look to the treaty.
When the drafters of the Refugee Convention formulated the
definition of refugee, they carved out five grounds under which a
claimant could establish asylum — race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, and membership in a particular social group — with gender
53
noticeably absent. According to the office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), the drafters “did not
deliberately omit persecution based on gender—it was not even
54
considered.”
While the exclusively male drafters may have
overlooked gender primarily because the treaty’s immediate focus
was the hundreds of thousands of European refugees displaced by
55
World War II, the exclusion of gender has also been attributed to
the drafters’ failure to recognize the experiences of women as
56
internationally relevant. Specifically, the drafters failed to recognize
that persecutors have harmed and would continue to harm women
57
because of their status as women.
After the recent horror of
genocide in Nazi-Germany, the foremost concern of the Convention
drafters in 1951 was the protection of persons persecuted for racial
58
and religious reasons.

52

See generally Binder, infra note 58.
Refugee Convention, art. 1(A)(2), supra note 44.
54
Judith Kumin, Gender: Persecution in the Spotlight, in 2 REFUGEES 12 (2001),
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/ (last visited on Aug. 30,
2002).
55
See UNHCR, The Refugee Convention at 50, at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/ (last visited July 23, 2002) (on file with author).
56
See Kumin, supra note 54, at 12 (“Little thought was given to forms of
persecution which might only affect women.”).
57
The fact that the male treaty drafters did not contemplate gender persecution
in 1951 does not mean that this form of persecution was unfamiliar to the world. For
example, in the decade before the drafting of the Convention, Japan forced over
200,000 Korean women into sexual slavery as euphemistically labeled “comfort
women” during World War II. See generally Etsuro Totsuka, Commentary on a Victory for
“Comfort Women:” Japan’s Judicial Recognition of Military Sexual Slavery, 8 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 47 (1999). Furthermore, throughout history, men have perpetrated mass
rapes of women during times of war. See Christopher Scott Maravilla, Rape as a War
Crime: The Implications of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s
Decision in Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, & Vukovic on International Humanitarian
Law, 13 FLA. J. INT’L L. 321 (2001); see also Beth Stephens, Humanitarian Law and
Gender Violence: An End to Centuries of Neglect?, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 87, 88
(1999) (calling rape during war “the accepted rule . . . in virtually all wars, by virtually
all military forces”).
58
See Daniel J. Steinbock, Refuge and Resistance: Casablanca’s Lessons for Refugee
Law, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 649, 686 (1993); see also Andrea Binder, Gender and the
“Membership in a Particular Social Group” Category of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167, 169-70 (2001) (noting that “ideologically-based concerns
53
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Thirty years after the document’s creation, however, genderbased human rights abuses gained publicity, provoking an
59
international response.
In 1979, the United Nations (“UN”)
enacted the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (“CEDAW”) in an effort to address the experiences
of women in a growing body of international human rights law, which
60
had largely ignored women.
A decade after the UN’s passage of CEDAW, however, the
systematic use of rape and forced impregnation during the war in
61
62
Bosnia, the continuing occurrence of female genital mutilation,
and the brutal oppression of women under the Taliban rule of
63
Afghanistan
evidenced the unyielding prevalence of gender
persecution in the world. In 1991, UNHCR issued Guidelines On
64
The Protection Of Refugee Women to ensure that victims of
gender-persecution would be included within the protection of the
65
Acknowledging the refugee definition as a
Refugee Convention.
66
potential hurdle for women seeking asylum, UNHCR urged state
parties to “[p]romote acceptance in the asylum adjudication process
of the principle that women fearing persecution or severe

by the West about the international protection of political dissidents from Eastern
European communist regimes” prompted the political opinion category).
59
Kumin, supra at 54 (“[T]he real turning point came in the 1990s . . . [when]
the movement to recognize the universality of human rights gained credibility.”).
60
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.
Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (entered into force
Sep. 3, 1981), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/index.html
[hereinafter “CEDAW”]. The introduction to CEDAW states that “among the
international human rights treaties, the Convention take an important place in
bringing the female half of humanity into the focus of human rights concerns.” Id.
61
For a discussion of the use of rape in war, specifically in Bosnia, and the
importance of medically documenting mass rape, see Shana Swiss, Rape as a Crime of
War: A Medical Perspective, 5 JAMA 612 (Aug. 4, 1993). For an argument that rape
during war is a form of genocide against women as a class, see Rumna Chowdhury,
Kadic v. Karadzic — Rape as a Crime Against Women as a Class, 20 LAW & INEQ. 91
(2002).
62
Jaimee K. Wellerstein, Comment, In The Name of Tradition: Eradicating the
Harmful Practice of Female Genital Mutilation, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 99,
100 (1999) (citing World Health Organization statistics showing that at the end of
the 1990s between 100 and 180 million women had undergone FGM).
63
See generally Amnesty International, Women in Afghanistan, Pawns in Men’s Power
Struggles (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.feminst.org/afghan/sdreports.html
(last visited Aug. 16, 2002) (on file with author).
64
Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women: Legal Procedures and Criteria for the
Determination of Refugee Status, UN Doc. ES/SCP/67 ¶ 57 (1991) [hereinafter “1991
UN Gender Guidelines”].
65
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 16.
66
Id. at ¶ 54.
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discrimination on the basis of their gender should be considered a
member of a social group for the purposes of determining refugee
67
status.”
In 1992, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women also addressed the growing number
of gender-based human rights abuses by urging state parties to take
deliberate steps in order to study, identify, prevent, and remedy
68
violence against women.
One of the committee’s General
Recommendations classified gender-based violence as a unique
category of discrimination, noting that it “seriously inhibits women’s
69
ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”
Canada was the first country to respond to UNHCR’s call,
adopting guidelines to facilitate the adjudication of gender-based
70
Through these guidelines, Canada made
asylum claims in 1993.
clear that “women” may qualify as a “particular social group” under
the Refugee Convention’s definition of refugee, which it had adopted
71
as the standard for its domestic asylum laws. Unlike Canada, the
United States did not readily acknowledge that gender alone may
form the basis of a “particular social group”—a gap that endures
72
under the proposed INS rule.
B. Delimiting Gender & “Social Groups” in the United States
Prompted

by

the

efforts

of

the

United

Nations

and


67

Id. The Guidelines noted that the refugee definition does not protect women
who face severe punishment and even death for defying cultural and social norms
that severely restrict women’s freedom, mobility, and autonomy. Id. at ¶ 54. In May
2002, UNHCR went a step further, releasing updated guidelines on the 1951 Refugee
Convention’s application to gender-related persecution, which delineate a
substantive analysis of gender-based asylum claims within existing asylum grounds
and directly address historical barriers to specific forms of gender-based persecution.
See 2002 UN Gender Guidelines, supra note 12.
68
General Recommendation 19: Violence Against Women, Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/38, at ¶ 1
(1992), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recomm.htm (last
visited Aug. 10, 2002).
69
Id. The Committee acknowledged that traditional views of women have led to
the perpetration of widespread violence and coercion including, “family violence
and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid attacks and female circumcision.” Id.
at ¶ 11.
70
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, Guidelines for Women Refugee
Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (Nov. 13, 1996), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/guidelines.html#Canada (on file with author);
see also Kumin, supra note 54.
71
See Deborah Anker, Refugee Status and Violence Against Women in the “Domestic”
Sphere: The Non-State Actor Question, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 392 (2001).
72
See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
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commentators to draw attention to the plight of persecuted women,
in 1995 the Director of the INS Office of International Affairs
addressed a memorandum to all Asylum Officers setting forth
guidelines for officers to follow when adjudicating women’s asylum
73
claims.
The guidelines state that “although women applicants
frequently present asylum claims for reasons similar to male
applicants, they may also have had experiences that are particular to
74
their gender.” The Guidelines declare that gender-specific abuse
such as, “rape (including mass rape in, for example, Bosnia), sexual
abuse and domestic violence, infanticide, and genital mutilation”
could serve “as evidence of past persecution on account of one or
75
more of the five grounds” for asylum under U.S. law. In spite of this
declaration, the Guidelines do not provide substantive guidance on
how asylum adjudicators should interpret gender-specific violence as
a demonstration of persecution on account of one of the five other
categories, nor on how judges could avoid stereotypes that frequently
76
emerge in gender-based claims.
In addition, the INS carefully pointed out — both within the
memorandum announcing the Guidelines and in subsequent
statements — that that the Guidelines do not expand or alter the
77
legal requirements of asylum eligibility under current law. While
some commentators commended the INS’s efforts for recognizing
78
women’s rights to protection under refugee law, others criticized
79
Critics noted in particular
the agency for not going far enough.

73

See INS Guidelines, supra note 32, at 1.
Id. at 4.
75
Id.
76
See id.; see also Diana Saso, The Development of Gender-Based Asylum Law: A Critique
of the 1995 INS Guidelines, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 282 (1997) (arguing that the
INS’s warning to officers not to jump to the conclusion that sexual violence against
women is personally motivated is ineffectual because it fails to give guidance on why
women’s gender-based claims are susceptible to this assumption and why the
assumption is wrong).
77
Victims of Torture: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Int’l. Relation, Subcomm. on
Int’l. Operations and Human Rights, 104th Cong., available at 1996 WL 10164383 (May
8, 1996) (Testimony of Phyllis A. Coven, Director of International Affairs
Immigration and Naturalization Service). Coven stated: “The Gender Guidelines
provide Asylum officers with substantive guidance on the cardinal principles of
American asylum law that bear on gender-related asylum cases . . . [but] do not
enlarge or expand the grounds for asylum that were specified by Congress and the
understanding the courts have reached about those grounds.” Id.
78
See, e.g., Deborah Anker, Women Refugees: Forgotten No Longer?, 32 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 771, 778 (1995) (stating that the INS guidelines “establish the rights of women
asylum claimants within the framework of current law and hopefully end a tradition
of interpretation by which women have been excluded”).
79
See, e.g., An Mai Nguyen, Comment, The Torture Convention: A Gap Filler for the
74
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that the subsequent impact of the guidelines, which are required
80
reading for immigration judges but are not binding law, has been
inconsistent as applied to certain forms of gender-based
81
persecution.
As commentators have argued and the R-A- decision illustrates, a
remaining hurdle to gaining asylum faced by victims of domestic
violence is the continued conception of this abuse as a private wrong
82
incapable of governmental redress. The reasoning of asylum judges
in the cases of women who have been raped also frequently exhibits
83
In several cases, judges have
this view of gender-violence.
determined that the sexual assault was merely an act of random
violence, reasoning that sexual desire or some factor other than one
84
of the five protected characteristics motivated the rape. While there
is no one answer to the question of why men rape—a problem which

Holes in U.S. Asylum Policy Towards Victims of Domestic Violence, 30 Sw. U. L. REV. 171,
180-81 (2000) (arguing that the Guidelines have been ineffective at improving
adjudication of gender-based asylum claims because of the simplicity of their primary
goal to increase sensitivity within the process, and because of the inconsistent
application of the law in light of the guidelines’ non-binding nature); Saso, supra
note 76, at 311 (arguing that although a positive step, “the Guidelines adopted a
circumspect rather than an expansive approach to gender-based asylum claims”).
80
See 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 771 (June 5, 1996).
81
See, e.g., Elizabeth Rho-Ng, The Conscription of Asian Sex Slaves: Causes and Effects
of U.S. Military Sex Colonialism in Thailand and the Call to Expand U.S. Asylum Law, 7
ASIAN L.J. 103 (2000) (arguing that INS Guidelines, which recognize rape and other
forms of sexual persecution, have been applied inconsistently—victims claiming rape
as grounds for asylum have had success, while victims of “morally suspect” forced
prostitution have not).
82
For a critique of how the conception of domestic violence as private conduct
has led immigration judges to deny asylum claims based on a finding of a lack of
state action, see Anker, supra note 71, at 391.
83
See Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women,
26 CORNELL INT’L L.J., 625, 640-41 (1993) (discussing cases that “reflect two pervasive
problems in evaluating the asylum cases of women: difficulty accepting rape and
other forms of sexual abuse as violence, and the tendency to ascribe personal
motivations to persecutors when the harm is sexual”).
84
See, e.g., Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding the
rape of the niece of an assassinated guerilla sympathizer did not constitute
persecution on account of political opinion but was an “act of random violence”);
Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming the denial of
asylum to a woman from El Salvador who had been violently raped and forced to
watch the brutal murder of her cousins and uncle with machetes); Klawitter v. INS,
970 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1992). In Klawitter the Sixth Circuit upheld the BIA’s denial
of asylum to a Polish woman who claimed that a government official “forced himself
on her and used violence against her while threatening to destroy her career.” Id. at
151. In archaic language that equates alleged abuse with attraction, and the
perpetration of constant harassment and fear as a desire to be a “paramour,” the
court explained that the officer’s “interest” was merely personal. Id. at 152.
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has produced extensive study and disagreement —many asylum
judges have been quick to view rape as personal and random in
86
nature and therefore outside the boundaries of asylum protection.
In light of these barriers to gender-based asylum claims, the 1996
87
BIA decision in In re Kasinga, which granted asylum to a woman
from Togo by reasoning that women fearing forced female genital
88
mutilation (“FGM”) may constitute “a particular social group,”
89
elicited much enthusiasm from refugee activists and scholars.
Commentators hoped that in addition to setting a precedent for FGM
cases the decision would expand protection for women seeking
90
asylum based on other forms of gender-persecution.
Other
commentators,
however,
criticized
Kasinga’s
fact-specific
91
explanation and questioned its potential impact on future asylum
92
cases.

85

For an argument that biology motivates rape, see Randy Thornhill, Symposium
on Biology and Sexual Aggression: Part I The Biology of Human Rape, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 137
(1999). For an argument that rape is inherently motivated by gender animus, see
Bonner, infra note 178 and Carney, infra note 178.
86
See, e.g., Klawitter, 970 F.2d at 152; see also Kelly, supra note 83.
87
In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996). The BIA described the FGM
procedure that Kasinga would be forced to endure as an extreme form in which
portions of the female genitalia would be cut away with knives causing extensive
bleeding, severe pain, several weeks of incapacitation, and serious risk of lifethreatening complications. Id. at 361.
88
FGM is a “medically unnecessary” procedure, which is endured by 80 to 110
million women worldwide and practiced in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and
Muslim parts of Asia. Female Genital Mutilation, JAMA (Dec. 6, 1995). FGM is
considered a right of passage within some cultures and typically occurs at the age of
seven, but causes women severe medical complications for the rest of their lives. Id.
89
See, e.g., Connie M. Ericson, In re Kasinga: An Expansion of the Grounds for Asylum
for Women, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 671 (1998); Arthur C. Helton & Alison Nicoll, Female
Genital Mutilation as Ground for Asylum in the United States: The Recent Case of In Re
Fauziya Kasinga and Prospects for More Gender Sensitive Approaches, 28 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 375 (1997); Tiajuana Jones-Bibbs, United States Follows Canadian Lead and
Takes an Unequivocal Position Against Female Genital Mutilation: In re Fauziya Kasinga, 4
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 275 (1997) (calling the decision a “courageous position”
which will serve as “precedent [to] guide 179 immigration judges in adjudicating like
claims by women fleeing FGM”); Karen Musalo, In re Kasinga: A Big Step Forward for
Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 853 (July 1, 1996); Mary M.
Sheridan, Comment, In re Fauziya Kasinga: The United States Has Opened Its Doors to
Victims of Female Genital Mutilation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 433 (1997).
90
See, e.g., Helton & Nicoll, supra note 89; Musalo, supra note 89.
91
The BIA reasoned that Kasinga had a well-founded fear of persecution as a
“member of social group consisting of young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu
Tribe who have not had FGM as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the
practice.” Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365.
92
See, e.g., James A. Lazarus, In Through the Side Door: Analyzing In Re Anikwata
Under U.S. Asylum Law and the Torture Convention, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 101, 114
(2000) (Kasinga “did not reach much beyond the facts of that particular case”);
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Two recent and inconsistent immigration decisions may
illustrate a basis for this criticism. In the context of the trafficking of
women, an immigration judge relied on Kasinga to grant asylum to a
93
woman facing forced prostitution in China. Another immigration
judge, however, found the “social group” argument unpersuasive in
the case of a Russian woman who was sold into sexual slavery and
94
endured daily rape and severe abuse by her captor.
Even after
Kasinga’s recognition that women may be persecuted as members of
social groups at least partly defined by gender, some immigration
judges continued to demonstrate an unwillingness to build upon
Kasinga’s reasoning and to extend protection to other persecuted
95
women. Three years after this important decision, however, in the
views of many refugee activists and scholars, gender-based asylum law
96
took an abrupt step backward. On June 11, 1999, the BIA issued its
decision in one of the most extreme cases of domestic violence
97
98
imaginable: In re R-A-.

Linda A. Malone, Beyond Bosnia and In Re Kasinga: A Feminist Perspective on Recent
Developments in Protecting Women from Sexual Violence, 14 B.U. INT’L L.J. 319, 336-37
(1996) (arguing that the “door to asylum may remain closed to many applicants
without the representation, documentation, and extraordinarily compelling facts
available to [Kasinga]”).
93
Matter of J-M-, 1, 16 (Immgr. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (reasoning that the applicant’s
objection to forced prostitution put her in “the same situation as the applicant in
Kasinga, who was in a society where she was being forced to undergo a procedure of
which she was a not in agreement”), at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/ij/364.
94
Gender Asylum Case Study 275, provided by the University of California,
Hastings College of Law Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/summaries/200-299/summary275.html (on file with
author). The immigration judge rejected all of the applicant’s asserted social group
theories, including one that described her membership in a particular social group
as “young women who refuse to consent to sex.” Id.
95
See, e.g., Gender Asylum Case Study 216, provided by the University of
California, Hastings College of Law Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/summaries/200-299/summary216.html (denying asylum
to a young woman kidnapped, raped, beaten and forced to work in a brothel on
grounds that sexual slavery is not a form of persecution addressed by asylum law);
Matter of G-R-, (Immgr. Ct. Jan. 26, 1995), at http://www.uchastings.edu (on file with
author).
96
See infra note 107.
97
The BIA decision recounts almost three pages of horrific abuse suffered by
Alvarado at the hands of her husband. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908-10 (B.I.A.
1999); see also Hannah R. Shapiro, The Future of Spousal Abuse as a Gender-Based Asylum
Claim: The Implications of the Recent Case of Matter of R-A-, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
463, 487 (2000) (quoting a National Public Radio interview, in which Karen Musalo,
Director of the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies stated that if asylum “can’t be
granted in a case where a woman is basically tortured by her husband over a ten-year
period—if in a case like this, there’s no protection, my God, in what cases would a
woman be protected?”).
98
22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908-10 (B.I.A. 1999).
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In her asylum application, Rodi Alvarado presented two theories
99
to establish her status as a refugee. First, Alvarado reasoned that
her husband persecuted her on account of her political opinion,
100
defined as her opposition to male domination.
Alternatively,
Alvarado argued that he persecuted her on account of her
membership in a particular social group, specifically “Guatemalan
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live under male
101
domination.”
The immigration judge who initially heard the case
agreed that Alvarado’s husband persecuted her both on account of
her membership in the asserted social group and because of her
102
imputed political opinion, and accordingly granted asylum.
On
appeal by the INS, the BIA rejected this reasoning, stating that “the
group identified by the immigration judge has not adequately been
103
shown to be a ‘particular social group’ for asylum purposes.”
According to the BIA, Alvarado “failed to show that her husband was
motivated to harm her, even in part, because of her membership in a
particular social group or because of an actual or imputed political
104
opinion.” In fact, the BIA seemed to suggest that Alvarado suffered
105
violence that had no purpose or motivation whatsoever, and that
106
she was simply cursed by marrying an evil man.
The decision
engendered widespread criticism and sparked renewed attention to
the lack of protection afforded to persecuted women under U.S.
107
asylum law.
When Attorney General Janet Reno vacated the decision on
January 18, 2001, she remanded the case to the BIA for

99

Id. at 911.
Id.
101
Id.
102
See Matter of Rodi Alvarado Pena (Immgr. Ct. Sept. 20, 1996), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/caselaw/ij/alvarado-ij.html.
103
R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 915 (“As their marriage proceeded, the level and frequency of his rage
increased concomitantly with the seeming senselessness and irrationality of his
motives.”).
106
See id. The BIA explained that “once having entered into this marriage, there
was nothing the respondent could have done or thought that would have spared her
(or indeed would have spared any other woman unfortunate enough to have
married him) from the violence he inflicted.” Id.
107
See, e.g., Lindsay A. Franke, Note, Not Meeting the Standard: U.S. Asylum Law and
Gender-Related Claims, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 605 (2000); Shapiro, supra note 97;
Bret Thiele, Persecution on Account of Gender: A Need for Refugee Law Reform, 11
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 238 (2000); Frederic Tulsky, Abused Woman is Denied
Asylum, WASH. POST, June 20, 1999, at A1.
100
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reconsideration in accordance with the proposed INS rule, stating
that the case should not be decided until the new regulations were in
108
final form.
Although the proposal received an answer and
comment period, under the Bush Administration, the INS has not
109
finalized any changes to the asylum regulations, and Rodi Alvarado
110
waits.
II. THE INS PROPOSAL
The proposed rule provides guidance on the interpretation of
three critical terms embodied in the definition of refugee:
“persecution,” “on account of,” and “membership in a particular
111
social group.”
These three terms have each produced analytical
barriers in asylum claims brought by women, particularly in cases in
which the persecutor is a non-state actor or in which the persecution
is deemed to occur in the “private sphere, outside both the realm of
112
recognized civil and political activity and the reach of the state”
The rule first explains that “persecution” is “serious harm or
suffering” measured by both the applicant’s subjective experience
113
and by an objective standard.
In addition, the “persecution” must
be inflicted by the government from which a refugee has fled or by a

108

See In re: Matter of Rodi Avlarado Pena, Att’y Gen. Order 2379-2001 (Jan. 19,
2001).
109
See generally Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76, 588
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
110
At least one refugee activist has expressed concern that the new rules may
never appear under the Bush Administration. See Fiona Morgan, The Politics of
Protection, at http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2001/01/09/asylum/ (Jan. 9,
2001) (quoting Alvarado’s lawyer and refugee activist Karen Musalo’s statement that
“[i]t is not unusual at all for the incoming new administration to yank all of the
regulations or other pending matters that have not been finalized”) (last visited Sept.
1, 2002) (on file with author). Even if the Bush administration does adopt the
proposed rule, it could be some time before the rule is finalized and binding. In the
case of INS regulations implementing the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act, although more comprehensive, it took four years from
the time the INS proposed the rules in January 1997 until the agency finalized them
in December 2000. Phillip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair,
16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 3 (2001).
111
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,597-76,598.
112
Dorothy A. Thomas, Acting Unnaturally: In Defense of the Civil and Political Rights
of Women, in FROM BASIC NEEDS TO BASIC RIGHTS 41, 42 (Margaret A. Schuler ed.,
1995) (noting that women have been excluded from human rights protection
because of the “relegation [of women] to the private sphere”); see also Emily Love,
Equality in Political Asylum Law: For a Legislative Recognition of Gender-Based Persecution,
17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 137 (1994) (noting that “distinctions between the
predominantly male-dominated public sphere and the female-dominated domestic
sphere can lead to the denial of [women’s] asylum claims”).
113
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,597.

2002

COMMENT

223

“person or group that that government is unwilling or unable to
114
control.”
Turning to the “on account of” definition, the rule states that
when a persecutor has “mixed motivations,” an applicant must prove
that her “protected characteristic is central to the persecutor’s motive
115
to act against [her].”
Although all asylum applicants have the
burden of proving motive to satisfy the asylum statute’s “on account
116
of” requirement, the proposal would alter the current analysis by
adding an inquiry into the centrality of the motive.
With respect to the “on account of” analysis, the INS rule
attempts to limit a principal aspect of the “on account of” reasoning
in the R-A- case: the BIA’s determination that Alvarado’s husband
could not have harmed her on account of her “membership in a
particular social group” because he did not target other women
117
sharing his wife’s “social group” characteristic.
Rejecting the BIA’s
reasoning, the INS clarifies that evidence that a person acts against
other members of an asserted social group is relevant, but not
118
required to establish motive.
In the rule’s summary, the INS
recognizes that a persecutor could potentially target an individual
precisely because of a specific characteristic, yet not attempt to harm
119
others possessing the same characteristic.
According to the INS,
this may be the case in the context of domestic violence, in which
social structures, such as a woman’s inferior status in a relationship,
can enable a persecutor to harm only one woman, the woman in a
120
domestic relationship with the abuser.

114

Id. The proposed rule sets forth considerations for asylum judges to evaluate
in determining whether a government is unable to control the persecution or
whether it is unwilling to intervene. Id. In interpreting whether the government has
taken any reasonable steps to control the conduct, and whether reasonable access to
state protection exists, the rule states that judges “may” consider a list of seven
sources of evidence, which include “government complicity” in relation to the harm,
“a pattern of government unresponsiveness,” and “general country conditions.” Id.
115
Id.
116
See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
117
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,592. The INS explained that an “important factor in the
Board’s decision” was the fact that “there was no evidence that [Alvarado’s husband]
would seek to harm other women who live with other abusive partners.” Id.
118
Id. at 76,598.
119
Id. at 76,592-76,593. The INS offered the example of a society in which
members of one race hold members of another race in slavery. Id. at 76,593. Noting
that if a slave owner beats his own slave but does not beat his neighbor’s slave, it
would still be reasonable to conclude that the victim’s race was the primary impetus
for the persecution. Id.
120
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,592-76,593. The INS noted that some of the other women
in society who share this characteristic for which the victim is being harmed may be
at risk of harm from their own partners on account of the same reasons. Id.
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In fact, the proposed rule stresses that applicants may rely on
circumstantial evidence demonstrating “patterns of violence in the
society against individuals similarly situated to the applicant” in order
121
to establish motive.
The INS reasons that this evidence may reflect
a country’s societal norms and demonstrate the relevant legal
122
system’s support for the persecutory conduct.
According to the
INS, this societal context may help reveal an abuser’s belief that he
possesses the authority to batter and control his victim “on account
123
of” her inferior position in the relationship.
Finally, the rule attempts to clarify the divergent interpretations
of “membership in a particular social group” articulated by the
124
In the summary to the proposed rule, the
various circuit courts.
drafters first acknowledge the scant judicial and administrative
interpretation defining what “is perhaps the most complex and
125
difficult to understand” of the five categories of asylum.
The INS
notes that under the Matter of Acosta analysis, the primary BIA
decision interpreting this term, “membership in a particular social
group,” requires that group members share a “common, immutable”
126
trait.
According to the INS, the proposed rule codifies the Acosta
approach by requiring that a social group consist of “members who
share a common, immutable characteristic, such as sex, color, kinship
ties, or past experience, that a member either cannot change or that
is so fundamental to the identity or conscience of the member that
127
he or she should not be required to change it.”
Although the INS
128
acknowledges that gender clearly meets this requirement,
the
agency’s proposed analysis does not end there. In addition to an
immutable characteristic, the rule enumerates several factors that
may be considered in determining whether a “particular social
group” exists:
(i) the members of the group are closely affiliated with each
other; (ii) the members are driven by a common motive or
interest; (iii) a voluntary associational relationship exists among
the members; (iv) the group is recognized to be a societal faction

121

Id.
Id.
123
Id. at 76,593.
124
For a discussion of the different interpretations of “social group” employed by
the various circuit courts, as well as the BIA, see B.J. Chisholm, Comment, Credible
Definitions: A Critique of U.S. Asylum Law’s Treatment of Gender-Related Claims, 44 HOW.
L.J. 427, 439-43 (2001).
125
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,593-76,595.
126
Id. at 76,589.
127
Id. at 76,598.
128
Id.
122
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or is otherwise a recognized segment of the population in the
country in question; (v) members view themselves as members of
the group; and (vi) the society in which the group exists
distinguishes members of the group for different treatment or
129
status than is accorded to other members of society.

Part III.E addresses how consideration of these additional factors
after an applicant has already established persecution based on an
immutable characteristic allows judges to continue the paradoxical
treatment of gender-based claims.
III. THE “R-A- RULE” OLD AND NEW HURDLES FOR WOMEN SEEKING
ASYLUM
A. Constructing a Societal Focus in the Nexus Analysis
When the United States Supreme Court made clear in INS v.
130
Elias-Zacarias
that an asylum applicant must demonstrate
persecution on account of her protected characteristic, it set a
baseline requirement that she proffer some evidence — whether in
direct or circumstantial form — showing that the characteristic
131
motivated the persecution.
The Court, however, did not quantify
the extent of the evidence required, nor did it explain how the
evidence might vary when applied to the various forms of
132
persecution.
The proposed rule and its commentary are consistent
with Elias-Zacarias in recognizing that in some instances
circumstantial evidence, such as patterns of abuse in the relevant
community or the inferior status of women in domestic relationships,
133
may meet the baseline requirement of proof. In addition, however,
to discussing the evidentiary role of societal information in “social

129

Id.
502 U.S. 478 (1992).
131
Id. at 482.
132
Id. at 483. In fact, the Court directly stated that a claimant need not provide
“direct proof of his persecutors’ motives.” Id. Several scholars have convincingly
criticized Elias-Zacarias and the overemphasis and misinterpretation of the nexus
requirement in asylum jurisprudence. Id. at 483. In fact, the Court directly stated
that a claimant need not provide “direct proof of his persecutors’ motives.” Id.
Several scholars have convincingly criticized Elias-Zacarias and the overemphasis and
misinterpretation of the nexus requirement in asylum jurisprudence. See, e.g., Karen
Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences?: Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human Rights Norms,
15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1179 (1994). Musalo argues that “the overarching objective of
the domestic and international refugee regime is protection of potential victims of
persecution, not punishment of persecutors.” “In this context,” Musalo argues, “the
inquiry should be on the effect of persecution on the victim and not on the intent of
the persecutor.” Id. at 1181-82.
133
See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
130
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group” claims, the INS should have followed the reasoning of the
dissent in the R-A- case and emphasized that factual circumstances
relating to the nature and context of the persecution may be the
134
primary indicator of motive in asylum cases.
By not discussing the
importance of this evidence in establishing motive, the INS failed to
fully resolve the flaws of the R-A- analysis, specifically, the BIA’s
egregious disregard of the nature and circumstances of the domestic
135
violence in the “on account of” inquiry.
Contrary to the INS’s assumption that direct evidence of
136
persecution is always considered, in the R-A- case, the BIA failed to
appreciate the husband’s stated desire to perpetuate his wife’s
submissive role, his use of violence when Alvarado was pregnant, and
137
the severe abuse directed at his wife’s genitalia —all powerfully
138
indicative of motive.
The nature of the abuse when Alvarado was

134

See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 938 (B.I.A. 1999) (dissenting opinion)
(“First, to assess motivation, it is appropriate to consider the factual circumstances
surrounding the violence.”).
135
Within the BIA’s discussion of nexus there is a noticeably absent consideration
of the sexual and gender-specific nature of the abuse, including the husband’s sexist
statements. See id. at 920-23.
136
See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (2000)
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (“As in any asylum or
withholding case, evidence about the persecutor’s statements and actions will be
considered.”).
137
See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 908.
The respondent’s husband raped her repeatedly. He would beat her
before and during the unwanted sex. When the respondent resisted,
he would accuse her of seeing other men and threaten her with death.
The rapes occurred “almost daily,” and they caused her severe pain.
He passed on a sexually transmitted disease to the respondent from his
sexual relations outside their marriage.
Once, he kicked the
respondent in her genitalia, apparently for no reason, causing the
respondent to bleed severely for 8 days. The respondent experienced
the most severe pain, when he forcefully sodomized her. When she
protested, he responded, as he often did, “You’re my woman, you do
what I say.
Id.
138
Compare with Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (1998), a Washington federal
district court case discussed in Julie Goldscheid & Risa E. Kaufman, Seeking Redress for
Gender-Based Bias Crimes – Charting New Ground in Familiar Legal Territory, 6 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 265, 273 (2000). In Ziegler, the court found evidence of gender bias, based
on allegations of rape, gender-specific epithets, and acts promoting stereotypes of
women’s submissive roles. Id. Although Ziegler was a VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
claim and not an asylum case, in determining that the persecutor was motivated by
gender bias, the court looked to similar forms of evidence available in the R-Arecord, but which the BIA ignored. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 908. “The [Ziegler]
court relied on evidence of severe and excessive attacks on the plaintiff, especially
during her pregnancy, and allegations that the violence was often without
provocation and specifically at times when the plaintiff asserted her independence.”
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pregnant is particularly revealing of motive because it occurred in
reaction to Alvarado’s possession of reproductive attributes shared by
women. For example, her husband dislocated Alvarado’s jaw when
her menstrual period was late and kicked her “violently” in the spine
139
“when she refused to abort her 3- to 4- month old fetus.”
One
could conceivably construe the husband’s motivation narrowly as his
anger over the conception of an unwanted child and thereby — in
the words of one commentator — “privilege the viewpoint of the
140
immediate oppressor.”
That argument, however, does not mitigate
the fact that Rodi Alvarado was attacked because she was pregnant,
something largely beyond her control and innate to her status as a
141
woman.
The husband’s brutal actions also manifest his desire to
physically control his wife’s body and decisions—further evidence
142
bearing on his view of his wife’s subordinate status.
In its failure to respond to the BIA’s blatant dismissal of
evidence related to the nature and circumstances of the abuse in the
R-A- case, the rule makes a subtle endorsement of the omission. In
less subtle terms, the rule suggests that without evidence of societal
143
patterns of abuse, an abuser’s motive may not be ascertainable.
Judges, however, have explicitly rejected this notion in other asylum
144
contexts. To satisfy the “on account of” burden of an asylum claim,
applicants only have to establish facts related to their own
145
persecution, not the persecution of others.
Ironically, the INS
attempted to avoid this suggestion in a slightly different context

Goldscheid & Kaufman, supra, at 273.
139
R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 908.
140
Chisholm, supra note 124, at 430 (criticizing asylum law’s tendency to construe
an applicant’s experience solely from the persecutor’s perspective and for “imposing
its understanding of the applicant’s experience” in the asylum analysis).
141
Compare Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 606-07 (finding the severity of a husband’s
attacks on his wife during her pregnancy revealing of gender motivation). For a
clinical discussion of the problem of abuse during pregnancy, see Andrew J. Satin et
al., Sexual Assault in Pregnancy, in 77 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 710 (noting that
“[t]he frequency and severity of domestic violence against pregnant women have
been shown to be increased, and the pregnant abdomen tends to be the primary site
of physical attack against this group”).
142
See supra notes 137 & 139 and accompanying text.
143
Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (stating that societal patterns of
abuse may be helpful to establishing a “prevalent belief within society . . . that cannot
be deduced simply by evidence of random acts”).
144
See, e.g., Makonnen v. INS, 44 F.3d 1378, 1383 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting in an
asylum case based on a “political opinion” claim that an applicant only has the
burden of proving his own persecution and does not have to establish that other
members of society were persecuted as well).
145
See Makonnen, 44 F.3d at 1378.
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within the proposed “R-A- rule.” It rejected the BIA’s interpretation
of the “on account of” analysis to require a showing that Alvarado’s
146
husband persecuted women in addition to his wife.
In spite of this
rejection of a societal focus with respect to an individual actor’s
victims, the “R-A- rule” adopts the BIA’s reasoning in the Alvarado
case to the extent it insists that a private actor’s motive be evaluated
147
in a societal context.
In R-A-, the BIA repeatedly focused on what the Board
148
considered the violence’s lack of societal relevance.
For example,
in the discussion of social group, the BIA gave weight to the
unfounded conclusion that in order for Alvarado’s social group
theory to work “the characteristic of being abused [must be]
149
important within Guatemalan society.”
The BIA was also troubled
by its belief that Guatemalan society did not perceive the asserted
150
group as a societal faction.
The “R-A- rule” properly refused to
impose a legal requirement that an asylum applicant show that her
persecutor seeks to harm other members of her asserted social
151
group.
The proposed rule’s inapposite statement, however, that
societal patterns of abuse may be necessary to establish a “prevalent
belief within society . . . that cannot be deduced simply by random
152
acts” undermines this limitation. The suggestion that domestic
violence may be a random act or crime perpetuates a view of nonstate actor violence as societally insignificant and beyond the reach of
153
asylum.
In this respect alone, the proposed “R-A- rule” is a sizeable
step backward.
As the dissenting opinion in the R-A- decision suggests, the BIA
could have found a nexus between the persecution Alvarado suffered
and her membership in the asserted group without evaluating the
patriarchal social structure and patterns of domestic abuse in
154
Guatemala.
The dissent set forth four factors — largely focusing

146

See 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,592-76,593.
See supra note 143.
148
See Chisholm, supra note 124.
149
In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 919 (B.I.A. 1999).
150
Id. at 918.
151
Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,592 (2000)
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
152
Id. at 76,593.
153
For a critique of the legal view of women’s persecution as occurring in the
domestic sphere, see Thomas, supra 112.
154
Addressing the factual record alone, the R-A- dissent noted that the facts
“reflect quite clearly that the severe beatings were directed at the respondent by her
husband to dominate and subdue her, precisely because of her gender.” R-A-, 22 I. &
N. Dec. at 938.
147
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on the nature and circumstances of the violence — for evaluating the
nexus between an applicant’s suffered abuse and the persecutor’s
motivations: (1) the factual circumstances of the violence, (2) the
incomprehensibleness of the actions as an inference that the
persecutor acted on account of the victim’s possession of a protected
characteristic, (3) the reason why such violence occurs, (4) and the
155
extent to which the persecutor acted with impunity.
One
commentator, echoing the approach of the R-A- dissent noted,
[T]he record plainly shows that Alvarado-Pena’s husband beat
her in order to subdue and control her, and further that he did so
because of her gender, as is evidenced by the repeated abuse
directed at her vagina, his attempt to abort her pregnancy, and
the rapes. Additionally it is clear that he harmed her on account
of her gender because of his repeated reminder “[y]ou are my
156
woman, you do what I say.”

By failing to take issue with the BIA’s refusal to value this direct
evidence, the INS contradicts its assertion that “[a]s in any asylum or
withholding case, evidence about the persecutor’s statements and
157
actions will be considered.”
In the context of gender-persecution,
the INS tacitly rejects the primacy of evidence relating to the factual
158
circumstances of the persecution in the “on account of” inquiry.
B. The Floodgates Are Strong
The INS and asylum adjudicators must not ignore the value of
direct evidence in the motive inquiry out of fear it will create an
asylum regime that allows every victim of rape or domestic violence to
159
qualify as a refugee.
The asylum framework already provides an
assurance against this slippery slope scenario because the asylum
statute only provides refuge to victims of rape or domestic violence
when the abuse rises to the level of “persecution”—meaning severe
harm or suffering occurring because of state action or by a private
155

Id.
See Franke, supra note 107, at 619 (citing In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 938-39
(B.I.A. 1999)).
157
See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (2000)
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
158
See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906; see also Goldscheid, infra note 181 (discussing
how evidence of the nature and circumstances of violence can reveal gender-bias).
159
See John Linarelli, Violence Against Women and the Asylum Process, 60 ALB. L. REV.
977, 984-85 (1997) (refuting the floodgates argument by noting other stringent
practical and legal barriers facing women seeking asylum); see also Helton & Nicoll,
supra note 89, at 387 (noting that the experience of Canada, which recognizes
persecution based on gender as sufficient for membership in a particular social
group undermines the floodgates argument).
156
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actor that a “government is unwilling or unable to control.”
In
addition to showing motive, establishing “persecution” is a separate
161
burden that every asylum applicant must meet.
When Congress
enacted the Refugee Act, it set the requirements for obtaining asylum
162
Asylum
and with them the safeguards against a flood of refugees.
judges thus exceed their adjudicatory role and undermine
Congressional intent when they ignore evidence bearing on an
element of asylum because of presuppositions about potential surges
in the refugee stream.
Asylum adjudicators also contravene the Refugee Act by
conflating the requirements of several asylum elements into a single
analysis. For example, in R-A-, the BIA strikingly confused its analysis
of the husband’s motivation with the analysis of whether Guatemala’s
tolerated his conduct—treating the latter as a step in determining the
163
former.
Instead of treating the inquiry into the private actor’s
motive and whether the conduct rose to the level of persecution
because of the state’s conduct as separate elements, the BIA fused the
164
two inquiries into one.
As a result, the BIA refused to find that
Alvarado’s husband had persecutory motives because it did not find
165
Guatemala culpable for failing to protect Alvarado.
Guatemala’s
alleged remedial efforts to address spousal abuse fueled the BIA’s
166
hesitancy to find that the husband had persecutory motives.
This analysis is problematic because a private actor’s motive
often has nothing to do with what a country is doing at large.
Furthermore, Guatemala’s failure to protect Alvarado, although
sufficient for a finding of “persecution,” may seem less culpable when
analyzed under the motive inquiry—which necessarily focuses on
deliberate actions, and in the asylum context, animus. Guatemala’s
failure to protect Alvarado, however, can be a basis for finding

160

See Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that
state action or a showing that a country is unwilling or unable to control persecution
by a private individual satisfies the Refugee Act).
161
Id.
162
P.L. 96-212, Refugee Act of 1980 Senate Report No. 96-256 (July 23, 1979)
(stating that the Refugee Act “provides for the first time the statutory requirements . .
. and defines and exerts congressional control over the process”).
163
See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 922. The BIA noted that because “some
measures [had] been pursued in an attempt to respond” to domestic violence in
Guatemala, it was “not convinced that the absence of an effective governmental
reaction to the respondent’s abuse translates into a finding that her husband
inflicted the abuse because she was a member of a particular social group.” Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
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“persecution” if either the state acted — or failed to act — because of
167
gender animus or if it was simply impotent to protect women.
As
the R-A- rule emphasizes, “[i]nherent in the meaning of the term
persecution is that the serious harm or suffering that an applicant
experienced or fears must be inflicted by the government of the
country of persecution or by a person or group that the government
168
is unwilling or unable to control.”
Not only is this manipulation of
the asylum framework analytically problematic, but it allows for unfair
results. It encourages judges to ignore private-actor persecution if it
finds a lack of state-animus or some evidence of a country’s remedial
169
measures.
While an ultimate determination about a person’s eligibility for
asylum may necessarily reflect conditions for women in a particular
country by virtue of a lack of state protection or the frequency of a
170
particular practice, the asylum framework must not conflate this
information with the evaluation of motive at the expense of direct
171
evidence of a private actor’s gender animus.
By putting state
conduct in the spotlight while evaluating private motive, the BIA
pushes private actor persecution back into the “domestic sphere.” In
doing so, the opinion reinforces a perspective rejected by
international law: that domestic and intimate abuses suffered by
172
women are irrelevant to human rights norms.
In addition to statutory safeguards that exist against a flood of
refugees, not every domestic violence case will present strong direct
evidence bearing on a persecutor’s motive; the availability and quality
173
of evidence will vary in every case.
Therefore, unlike a per se rule
174
governing the motive inquiry in gender-specific abuse cases,
evaluating direct evidence will not automatically equal a find of

167

65 Fed. Reg. 76,597.
Id.
169
See, e.g., R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 922.
170
See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996) (finding that
applicant had well-founded fear of persecution based on her membership in a
particular social group, and that her fear of persecution was country-wide).
171
See Khan, infra note 175.
172
See Setareh, infra note 293
173
See Malone, supra note 92 (noting that the “door to asylum may remain closed
to many applicants without the representation, documentation, and extraordinarily
compelling facts available to [Kasinga].”).
174
While a per se rule governing the motive inquiry for certain forms of genderpersecution is analytically sound, see infra note 178, because it is unfeasible that the
INS would ever accept this standard given its well-established concern about opening
the door too widely to gender-based claims, see supra note 77, this comment
addresses the practical and does not evaluate the debate at length.
168
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persecution on account of gender.
On the other hand, if a fair evaluation of the evidence in the
cases of all victims of domestic violence seeking asylum from a
particular country results in a determination that the persecutor in
each case acted on account of the person’s gender, then that
conclusion should be honored, not avoided. To ignore this evidence
would create an asylum adjudication regime that inappropriately
worries more about the number and types of refugees entering the
country rather than accurate and fair interpretation of its governing
175
statute.
Moreover, even if this hypothetical were a reality, because
of the practical barriers facing female asylum-seekers, such as
economic factors and the physical inability to escape repressive
176
177
conditions, a wave of refugees is unlikely.
While these barriers to gaining asylum may provide some
reinforcement to the floodgates and assuage the INS’s apparent
weariness about allowing direct evidence of persecution to prove too
178
much,
the number and quality of the safeguards limiting the
amount of successful asylum applications should be irrelevant to the
question of motive. To preserve the integrity of the asylum process
and fair interpretation of the Refugee Act, the INS should ensure
that full weight be given to direct evidence of motive. The INS
should require asylum adjudicators to look squarely at available
evidence that demonstrates gender-targeted and specific abuse,
gender-permeated invectives, and persecutors’ stated desires to
179
oppress or control women.

175

For an argument that the United States justifies the number of refugees it
admits based on national interest as opposed to humanitarian concerns, see Rex D.
Khan, Why Refugee Status Should be Beyond Judicial Review, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 57, 72-73
(2000).
176
See infra notes 328-29 and accompanying text.
177
See commentary refuting the floodgates argument, supra note 159.
178
The INS’ erection of new barriers in the asylum process may reveal its
weariness of the idea that some forms of gender-based violence would create a
slippery slope because they are inherently gender-motivated, a position persuasively
articulated by several scholars. See, e.g., Rebekka S. Bonner, Note, Reconceptualizing
Vawa’s “Animus” for Rape in States’ Emerging Post- Vawa Civil Rights Legislation, 111 Yale
L.J. 1417, 1421 (2002) (stating that “[a]ll rapes necessarily contain an inherent
gender animus”); Kathryn Carney, Rape: The Paradigmatic Hate Crime, 75 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 315, 319-20 (2001) (arguing that “the rape victim is selected because she
possesses an immutable characteristic — her gender. . . . [r]ape is not an act of
violence that simply happens to women — it is an act of hate that happens to women
because they are women”); see also Eric Rothschild, Recognizing Another Face of Hate
Crimes: Rape As a Gender-Bias Crime, 4 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 231, 262-85
(1993).
179
See generally Goldscheid, infra note 181 (evaluating the sources of evidence
available to determine gender bias in hate crimes). To evaluate this evidence would
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Should, however, an increase in the number of refugees pose a
realistic concern, the legislature, not asylum judges, should respond
with measures that impact all categories of asylum applicants equally.
Currently, in asylum cases brought on other grounds, such as
persecution on account of a person’s race, the question of motive
focuses primarily around the direct actions and words of the abuser,
while societal information often serves only to provide additional
180
context.
The words of a persecutor are not more ambiguous
merely because they contain gender slurs as opposed to racial slurs
181
and because they are directed at a woman.
The actions of an
abuser that degrade or humiliate a person racially are not more
182
instructive of motive than acts aimed to degrade a woman sexually.
In short, asylum adjudicators should not transform gender-based
violence into a form of persecution that can only be understood and
established if an applicant demonstrates a larger societal pattern of
183
Allowing judges to turn a blind eye to
abuse and inequality.
valuable evidence of motive is not a fair solution to fears of opening
the refugee floodgates and would deny women with significant

make accurate the INS’s otherwise unsupported statement that “[a]s in any asylum or
withholding case, evidence about the persecutor’s statements and actions will be
considered.” See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
180
For example, in evaluating cases involving the persecution of Indo-Fijian
people by ethnic Fijans the Ninth Circuit has found persecution on account of race
in part by evaluating persecutors’ racially intolerant statements made during
persecutory acts. See, e.g., Gafoor v. I.N.S., 231 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that
the persecutor’s statement that the applicant “should go back to India” compels the
conclusion that he was persecuted at least in part because of race); Surita v. I.N.S., 95
F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding racial motive where soldiers threatened
applicant of Indian descent and robbed her more than a dozen times telling her they
were looting her house because she was Indian and that she should return to India).
The courts, however, viewed these statements against the backdrop of the
tumultuous ethnic tension in Fiji documented by State Department country reports
describing a recent coup by ethnic Fijans and their fierce discrimination against
persons of Indian descent. Surita, 95 F.3d at 817-18.
181
See generally Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful
Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 123, 132 (1999) (arguing
prior to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the VAWA civil rights remedy that
“courts can rely on the same types of evidence to assess gender-motivation in
analyzing the presence of bias underlying violent crimes committed against women”
as they routinely do to analyze bias in other harassment and violence cases).
182
See id. at 158. Goldscheid, argues that “[a]n analysis of cases of domestic
violence and sexual assault, as well as an analysis of other bias crime cases, reveals the
circumstantial evidence of the bias that animates violent crimes committed against
women just as it does in other types of bias crime cases.”
183
See generally Chisholm, supra note 124, at 452 (criticizing the emphasis in
asylum law on whether the persecution is “societally important” for vesting
oppressors with the power to define social groups).
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184

motive evidence equal access to refuge.
C. The Role of Societal Evidence

It is important to note, however, that focusing on the nature of
abuse in interpreting motive does not undercut the importance of
understanding systemic power structures and societal norms in
185
determining why abuse occurs.
As Kasinga makes clear, societal
evidence may be instrumental for asylum applicants when
186
demonstrating both motive and a lack of state protection.
In
Kasinga, the BIA evaluated the motive of the would-be persecutors by
considering the gender-specific nature of the FGM procedure, as well
as its gender-specific purpose “to suppress and control the victim on
187
Thus, the INS rule properly notes that
account of her gender.”
asylum judges may consider societal information when relevant, but
ultimately fails by allowing it to supplant direct evidence within the
discussion of the “on account of” requirement.
Although the asylum analysis requires an evaluation of the
protections from persecution available in a country from which a
188
person seeks to escape, the question of whether an act rises to the
level of persecution should not focus exclusively on legal measures
189
condoning certain persecutory acts.
As UNHCR has recently
noted, “[e]ven though a particular state may have prohibited a
persecutory practice . . . the state may nevertheless continue to
condone or tolerate the practice, or may not be able to stop the
190
practice.”
Therefore, an evaluation of a state’s unwillingness or
inability to protect a individual should consider not only a country’s

184

See, e.g., In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), and discussion supra notes
136-45.
185
See Chisholm, supra note 124, at 429-30 (arguing that “gender-based violence
and persecution are supported by social institutions, which deliberately deny the
voice of authority and credibility to oppressed groups”).
186
See, e.g., Aguirre-Cervantes v. I.N.S., 242 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the
prevalence of domestic and sexual violence in Mexico and its vastly underreported
nature persuasive evidence of the Mexican government’s inability or unwillingness to
control a father’s abusive behavior). The court confronted evidence that over 13,000
children living on Mexican streets were victimized by family members, that Mexican
women are extremely reluctant to report abuse, and that police officials are reluctant
to intervene in what society deems private matters. Id.
187
In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996).
188
See INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
189
See 2002 UN Gender Guidelines, supra note 12, at ¶ 11 (stating “that the fact that
a law has been enacted to prohibit or denounce certain persecutory practices will
therefore not in itself be sufficient to determine that the individual’s claim to
refugee status is not valid”).
190
Id.
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legal provisions, but also the reality of social practice.
D. A Higher Burden to Establish Motive

The question of whether rape and other forms of gender
persecution are always persecution on account of one’s gender, as
192
193
some scholars have argued and others have rejected, is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
However, having discussed the
appropriate sources of information to determine gender-based
motive, this section addresses the circumstances in which an
applicant can successfully present evidence of gender bias, but
nevertheless would be unable to establish asylum under the proposed
rule’s motive inquiry.
In contravention of established BIA precedent and circuit court
194
decisions, the proposed rule raises the evidentiary burden in the
“on account of” analysis by requiring not only that an applicant
establishes her persecutor’s motive, but also that she demonstrates,
where a persecutor has mixed motivations, that her “protected
195
characteristic is central to her persecutor’s motivation to act.” With
respect to this heightened burden, commentary has convincingly
196
noted a contradiction.
First, the INS acknowledges that under BIA
and federal court decisions, a persecutor acting “at least in part”
because of a protected characteristic satisfies the “on account of”
197
requirement.
Then the rule proposes the “central” motivation
analysis, a much tougher standard than the “at least in part”
198
inquiry. While the INS offers no explanation for the contradiction,
the context of the rule’s proposal may illuminate the INS’s decision

191

See supra notes 188-90.
See Bonner, supra note 178; Carney supra note 178.
193
See generally Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward
Explanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827 (1999).
194
See, e.g., Matter of T-M-B-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 775, 777 (B.I.A. 1997) (stating “that
an applicant for asylum need not show conclusively why persecution occurred in the
past or is likely to occur in the future, [but must] produce evidence from which it is
reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or
imputed protected ground”); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a Philippine asylum applicant demonstrated that a revolutionary group
persecuted her at least in part on account of her political opinion while finding that
economic extortion also motivated their actions).
195
Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,598 (2000)
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
196
See Anita Sinha, Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum Law: Eliminating the “Cultural
Hook” For Claims Involving Gender-Related Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1562, 1594-95
(2001).
197
Id.
198
Id.
192
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to heighten the motive inquiry.
The INS proposed the mixed-motivation burden as part of the
“R-A- rule,” a proposal touted by the INS as resolving issues prevalent
199
in gender-based asylum claims.
Technically, the proposed “R-Arule’s” interpretation of the term “on account of” could apply equally
200
to the motive inquiry in all kinds of asylum claims.
However,
because of the gendered context in which the INS has submitted its
201
proposal, the higher burden has particular significance for women
persecuted because they are women.
The central motive
requirement indicates the INS’s skepticism of gender-bias as the
202
primary motivation for abuse in gender persecution claims and
203
thus necessitating additional safeguards in the asylum framework.
Whether, however, a person is persecuted because of his or her
religion, race, or gender, asylum law does not protect victims of
204
random crimes.
The requirement that the injury be more
significant than a random crime is already subsumed in the
“persecution” element of the asylum statute, which must be
205
established by all asylum applicants.
By inserting the “central
motivation” burden into the “on account of” discussion of the “R-Arule,” the INS implies that gender persecution requires additional
asylum safeguards because, in comparison to other forms of
persecution, violence against women is harder to distinguish from

199

65 Fed. Reg. at 76,588 (noting that the rule “establishes principles for
interpretation and application of various components of the statutory definition of
‘refugee’ . . . and, in particular will aid in the assessment of claims made by
applicants who have suffered or fear domestic violence”).
200
The proposed rule merely provides a general definition for “on account of,”
without limiting its application to gender-based claims. See id. at 76,597.
201
See id. at 76,588.
202
Commentators have pointed out that the idea that gender-based asylum claims
can be held to a higher standard than claims based on other grounds has been
expressly rejected by the INS. See, e.g., Caroline J. O’Neill, Comment, Health Is a
Human Right: Why the U.S. Immigration Law Response to Gender-Based Asylum Claims
Requires More Attention to International Human Rights Norms, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 241, 272 (2000) (noting that the INS Guidelines reject the notion that
gender-based claims are less valid than other asylum claims).
203
In the summary to the proposed rule the INS draws the distinction between
patterns of abuse in a society and random acts of violence. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,593.
204
Id. at 76,590.
205
As the INS states in the summary to the proposed rule, “[i]nherent in the
meaning of persecution is the long-standing principle that the harm or suffering that
an applicant experienced or fears must be inflicted by either the government of the
country where the applicant fears persecution, or a person or group that government
is unable to control.” Id. (citing Matter of Villalta, 20 I & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A.
1990)).
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ordinary crimes outside the scope of asylum protection.
Thus, the
INS proposal again perpetuates a view of gender violence as
207
occurring in the domestic sphere and lacking societal significance.
Even though domestic violence and rape may be rampant
throughout the world, if the abuse rises to the level of harm required
by the asylum statute and a state is unable or unwilling to protect the
woman, then this abuse constitutes persecution, and should not be
208
regarded as an ordinary crime.
This does not mean that every
woman who is the victim of rape or domestic violence and whose
209
It
government fails to prevent the crime should gain asylum.
should mean, however, that a woman will meet the definition of a
refugee if she establishes a well-founded fear of persecution by means
of rape in a country where rape is socially acceptable and the
210
government does nothing, or is impotent, to prevent and punish it.
For example, in Mexico, where the penalties for stealing a cow are
harsher than the penalties for rape, the authorities rarely investigate
211
rape.
In fact, a legislator there has referred to the practice of
212
abducting, raping, and then marrying women as “romantic.”
As noted earlier, the fact that state perpetrated violence against
women should readily produce a finding of persecution should not
conversely prevent the same finding for women from countries where
laws may condemn certain practices in words, but unfettered abuse
213
occurs as a matter of course.
In Guatemala, for example, as noted
by the BIA, “spouse abuse is recognized as a problem, and . . . some

206

Commentators expressed this same fear in the context of the debate over the
enactment of the VAWA civil rights remedy and over amending the federal hate
crimes legislation to include gender bias. See the discussion of objections in
Goldscheid, supra note 181, at 126 n.15. Goldscheid notes the ample evidentiary
sources present in typical cases for determining gender bias and argues that the fact
that women are often victimized by persons they know does not justify treating
gender bias differently from other bias-motivated crimes. Id. at 156.
207
See Thomas, supra note 112 and accompanying text; see also Love, supra note
112.
208
See the discussion of FGM as persecution in In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357,
365 (B.I.A. 1996).
209
The proposed rule recognizes this limitation of asylum within the context of its
discussion of persecution. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,592 (noting that “[o]f course, no
government is able to guarantee the safety of each of its citizens at all times . . . this is
not the standard for determining that a government is ‘unable or unwilling to
control’ the infliction of harm or suffering”).
210
Compare with the racial persecution cases cited supra note 180, in which the
courts correctly factored in evidence that the police flatly ignored applicants’
complaints of persecution.
211
Mary Jordan, In Mexico, An Unpunished Crime, WASH. POST, June 30, 2002, at A1.
212
Id.
213
See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
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measures have been pursued in an attempt to respond to this
214
acknowledged problem.”
In spite of these measures, however, the
Guatemalan authorities “did not take further action” when Alvarado’s
husband ignored three police citations and continued to abuse his
215
wife.
Acknowledging the complete failure of Guatemala to protect
Alvarado, the BIA nevertheless denied her asylum claim, unwilling to
216
find persecution in light of the country’s alleged remedial efforts.
Unfortunately, the BIA’s reasoning adopts form over reality in the
analysis of persecution. Regardless of affirmative measures to address
spousal abuse in Guatemala, because of the unwillingness of the
authorities to protect Alvarado, her chances of leading a life free of
abuse were arguably no better in Guatemala than if she had lived in
Nigeria, a country with certain regional laws that expressly permit
217
husbands to abuse their wives.
Therefore, in sorting out whether
asylum applicants have a well-founded fear of persecution as opposed
to fear of random crime, the focus of asylum adjudication should be
218
the reality of country conditions as opposed to legal formality.
E. Inviting Disparate Treatment of Sexual Violence Claims
Even in an obvious case of state sanctioned abuse, under the
central motivation standard proposed by the rule, a judge could deny
asylum to a woman victimized by sexual violence, who otherwise
meets the requirements of asylum based on the “on account of”
element of her case. Under the INS proposal, a judge could
potentially find that sexual desire was the primary motive, looking
past a persecutor’s attitudes about women supported by the country’s
219
archaic laws or sexist culture.
This threatens to create a different
standard of treatment for women’s persecution, a possibility
220
previously rejected by scholars and the INS itself.
Unlike persecution inflicted against persons because of their

214

In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 922 (B.I.A. 1999)
Id. at 909.
216
Id. at 922.
217
See Words and Deeds: Holding Governments Accountable in the Beijing +5 Review
Process, EQUALITY NOW 28 (Jul. 1999) (citing the Penal Code of Northern Nigeria,
Section 55. Correction of Child, Pupil, Servant or Wife) (on file with author).
218
See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
219
For a criticism of the skepticism or differential treatment of gender bias as
opposed to racial or religious bias, see Goldscheid, supra note 181.
220
See O’Neill, supra note 202; see also U.S. Guidelines supra note 32, at 9 (stating
that the analysis for gender-based claims should be the same as other claims under
the current framework and that the “appearance of sexual violence in a claim should
not lead adjudicators to conclude automatically that the claim is an instance of
purely personal harm”).
215
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race or religion, gender-based persecution is often sexual in nature
222
and inflicted by persons known to the victim.
As one scholar has
noted in a critique of state hate crimes legislation, “this fact
necessarily gives rise to highly complicated mixed-motive inquiries
that are largely absent from typical hate crimes directed against
blacks, Jews, or other targeted groups where the attacker is often
223
unknown to the defendant.”
Because of the greater opportunity
224
for gender-based asylum claims to elicit a mixed-motive inquiry,
women’s claims may more frequently trigger the proposed “central”
motivation requirement. Thus, the rule increases the potential for
differing treatment of women’s claims: In the context of genderpersecution the central motive may habitually be attributed to sexual
desire or personal circumstances, rather than gender-animus, due to
the fact that violence against women is frequently sexual in nature
225
and is often deemed to occur in the domestic sphere.
In
comparison, because men’s claims do not fall disproportionately in
the realm of sexual and personal violence, their claims will not
trigger the higher burden as frequently. This disparity is problematic
on two levels. First, conceptually, it reveals the INS’s skeptical view of
gender-based violence as animus toward a group, thus perpetuating
226
stereotypes of women’s experiences as personal and irrelevant.
Second, pragmatically, it gives judges a tool, indeed a veritable signal,
227
to continue to discount women’s gender-based claims.
When the abuse at issue is not sexual in nature, the rule still
poses troubling barriers for women. The added “central motivation”
limitation gives judges substantial discretion to interpret motivation
228
even when the nature of abuse indicates a strong gender bias.
For
example, a judge could find that the persecutor acted violently not

221

See generally Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its
Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Submitted in Accordance
with Commission On Human Rights Resolution 1995/85, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53
(Feb. 5, 1996) [hereinafter “Special Rapporteur’s Violence Against Women Report”].
222
See Bonner, supra note 178, at 1439.
223
See id.
224
See id.
225
See id; see also Thomas, supra note 112.
226
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
227
For a discussion of the historical view of domestic violence as personal and
unworthy of asylum protection, see Anker, supra note 82.
228
Essentially, the modification allows for a repeat of the BIA’s superficial and
rigid interpretation of motive. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 921 (B.I.A. 1999)
(stating that Alvarado’s husband harmed her “for not getting an abortion, for his
belief that she was seeing other men, for not having her family get money for him,
for not being able to find something in the house, for leaving a cantina before him,
for reasons related to his mistreatment in the army, and ‘for no reason at all’”).
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because of an animus toward a particular group but primarily
229
because he is a generally violent person.
Moreover, a judge could
230
easily find that any ephemeral stimulus, such as jealousy
or
231
revenge, motivated the act. In contrast to the approach advocated
by the proposed rule, courts have previously found persecution on
account of a protected characteristic even in cases where the facts
suggested that a generic emotion or stimulus was a primary
232
motivation.
As the INS has noted previously, gender-based claims
233
are entitled to comparable treatment in the asylum analysis.
In the absence of an “at least in part” motive analysis, the
heightened requirement of proving motivation encourages more
234
erroneous decisions in domestic violence cases, such as In re G-R-.
In this case, the judge denied asylum to a woman from El Salvador
based on his determination that her husband did not harm her
because of her “membership in a particular social group,” defined as
235
“women who refuse to submit to and leave their batterers.”
According to the judge, the abuse, which involved severe beatings,
strangulation, and sexual assault that occurred in front of her
236
daughter, “was a personal problem.”
Calling the husband
paranoid, the judge stated the following:
[H]er ex-husband . . . is not after her because she is an abused
woman or because she shares some characteristic with any other
women, but simply because she is the respondent, the woman he
believed to be his woman, and that he feels he has the right to
237
abuse, and the right to punish because she left him.

Deeming this motivation beyond the reach of asylum protection, the
immigration judge in this case failed to recognize, or even to

229

See id. at 926 (crediting the husband’s motivation as “simple unchecked
violence tied to the inherent meanness of his personality”); see also Melgar de Torres,
191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding rape by Salvadoran guerillas was a random
act of violence).
230
See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 926.
231
See, e.g., Lim v. I.N.S., 224 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (awarding asylum based on
a finding that the New People’s Army (“NPA”) in the Philippines was motivated to
persecute the applicant by both revenge and her political opinion, in other words,
“revenge plus,” essentially “revenge partly motivated by, and thus on account of,
imputed adverse political opinion”).
232
See id.
233
See U.S. Guidelines, supra note 220 and accompanying text; see also O’Neill,
supra note 220.
234
Matter of G-R-, (Immgr. Ct. Jan. 26, 1995) at http://www.uchastings.edu (on file
with author).
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
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consider, how the husband’s view of women formed the basis for his
238
treatment and attitude toward his wife.
Similarly, the BIA in In re R-A- failed to consider how the
husband’s view of women affected his actions. Although the BIA
noted in its discussion of Alvarado’s political opinion claim that “the
respondent’s account of what her husband told her may well reflect
his own view of women and, in particular his view of the respondent
as his property to do with as he pleased,” the BIA shockingly did not
find this conclusion relevant to the “on account of” discussion of
239
Alvarado’s “particular social group” claim.
Both judges’ failure to
evaluate this connection in In re G-R- and in In re R-A-abrogated the
fundamental charge of the asylum adjudicator in applying the “on
account of’” analysis: to evaluate whether the persecutor inflicts harm
on the victim in order to punish her for having a protected
240
characteristic.
The proposed rule facilitates more superficial motive analyses by
giving judges room to credit paranoia or a controlling personality as
the primary motivation for an abuser’s acts instead of acknowledging
the underlying reasons for why gender persecution occurs. The UN
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women has found that
domestic violence is the result of a desire “to punish, humiliate, and
241
exercise power over the victim on account of her gender.”
Following the proposed rule, however, judges would fail to scrutinize
this information and its applicability to a given case. Unlike the
analysis of other traditional asylum claims, such as torture based on
political opinion which may have both a specific purpose (to elicit
information through harm) and a broader purpose (to intimidate or
punish a group), the rule encourages judges not to take account of
242
the deeper impulses at work. Against the backdrop of the historical

238

Id.
In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 914-15 (B.I.A. 1999).
240
See INS Guidelines, supra note 32, at 10 (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec.
at 226, for the proposition that an asylum applicant satisfies the “on account of”
analysis by showing that she was persecuted because of her possession of a protected
characteristic).
241
See Anker, supra note 78, at 741 (citing Special Rapporteur’s Violence Against
Women Report, 1995/85, at 7 ¶¶ 23, 14, 53 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53).
242
The potential for the unjustified unequal treatment of the motive inquiry with
respect to gender persecution claims is illustrated by the UN Special Rapporteur’s
discussion of the similarities between torture and domestic violence. See Special
Rapporteur’s Violence Against Women Report, supra note 221, at ¶¶ 42-44. Urging
states to abandon views of domestic violence as occurring for personal reasons, the
report states that like torture, domestic violence may be committed for specific
purposes such as “eliciting information, punishment, [and] intimidation” but also
like torture, the persecutor has broader motives. Id. at ¶ 44. He acts “to obliterate
239
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view of gender violence as private acts, the “central motivation”
standard invites asylum adjudicators to continue to skim the surface
in the analysis of motive.
Furthermore, the change increases the already nebulous burden
244
on asylum claimants to prove their persecutor’s motive.
It requires
her to delve further into her persecutor’s psyche, sort out, and prove
245
In
what is and is not central to his motivation to act against her.
the absence of a sound legal justification for this higher evidentiary
246
burden, which the rule’s commentary does not provide,
the
proposed rule arbitrarily makes it more difficult for women who are
victims of gender persecution to establish a nexus between the
247
persecution they suffered and a protected characteristic.
Thus, the
rule fails to transform the asylum process for gender-based claims and
248
continues to disregard the experience of women in refugee law.

the personality and diminish the capacities of the woman . . . . As in torture,
battering may involve a humiliating interrogation whose purpose is more the
assertion of supremacy and possession over the victim than the acquisition of
information.” Id.
243
See generally Anker, supra note 71.
244
For a discussion of the difficult burden placed on asylum applicants to
demonstrate why their persecutor acted against them, see Kevin R. Johnson,
Responding to the “Litigation Explosion”: The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy
Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 465, 468 (1993) (characterizing the burden on
asylum applicants to establish their persecutors’ intent after Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.
478 (1992), as near impossible); Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing
Refugee Protections from Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1179, 1182 (1994)
(criticizing the Elias-Zacarias decision for placing “an unrealistic evidentiary burden
on the applicant, who must divine the motivation of her persecutor and then carry
the burden of proof on this issue”).
245
See Sinha, supra note 196, at 1594 (stating that the proposed “nexus
requirement renders the evidentiary burden even more onerous”).
246
See id. at 1595 (discussing the INS’s strange explanation that requiring a
central purpose was necessary to allow for claims when a persecutor has mixed
motivations, which the author notes, was a concept already recognized by the asylum
framework under the “at least in part” inquiry).
247
See Musalo, supra note 244, at 1202-03 (noting that establishing a persecutor’s
motivation is already exceedingly difficult because knowledge of intent usually lies
with the persecutor and the applicant does not have the opportunity to put the
persecutor on the stand and elicit this information).
248
Several scholars have discussed and criticized the exclusion of women’s
experiences from the development of international human rights law. See, e.g.,
Florence Butegwa, International Human Rights Law and Practice: Implications for Women,
in FROM BASIC NEEDS TO BASIC RIGHTS 41, 43 (Margaret A. Schuler ed., 1995)
(arguing that that international law’s creation of a hierarchy among human rights
has left women without adequate protection); see also Berta Esperanza HernándezTruyol, Sex, Culture, and Rights: A Re-Conceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First
Century, 60 ALB. L. REV. 607, 610-11 (1997) (arguing that the exclusion of women
from the creation of international human rights law has resulted in gender-based
abuses being largely overlooked).
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F. Membership In A Particular Social Group
In attempting to resolve the conflicting interpretations of
249
“membership in a particular social group,”
the proposed rule
requires the presence of a “common, immutable” trait as a threshold
250
element of a social group.
Although the INS commentary to the
proposed rule states, “gender is clearly such an immutable trait . . .
251
and is incorporated in this rule,” the INS proposal suggests that an
applicant who establishes that she has been persecuted based on an
immutable trait, such as gender, may nevertheless fail to meet the
definition of a refugee.
Establishing persecution based on the immutable trait of gender
may not be enough under the proposed rule because the INS sets
forth six additional factors, which “may be considered in determining
252
whether a particular social group exists.”
As one scholar has
pointed out, the presence of these additional factors creates a two253
tiered analysis. First, a “social group” must consist of members with
254
a common, immutable characteristic.
Having found an immutable
trait, a judge may then consider the extent to which the group is a
255
cohesive and societally-recognized group.
The rule proposes that asylum adjudicators evaluate this second
256
prong by considering six flexible factors.
According to the rule’s
commentary, the first three factors essentially constitute a “voluntary
associational test” which incorporates the definition of “social group”
established by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hernandez257
Montiel v. INS.
The commentary asserts that Hernandez-Montiel
restated the Ninth Circuit’s formulation of a social group as “a
collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are
258
actuated by some common impulse or interest.”
In contrast, however, to the INS’s conjunctive interpretation of
the Ninth Circuit’s approach, the Hernandez-Montiel decision can be

249

For a discussion of the different circuit courts’ interpretations of social group,
see Chisholm, supra note 124, at 433-44.
250
See id. (noting that the immutability test is a “threshold or baseline
requirement”).
251
Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (2000)
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
252
Id. at 76,594.
253
See Chisholm, supra note 124, at 448.
254
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,598.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id. at 76,594 (quoting Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000)).
258
Id.
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logically read as setting forth the immutability requirement and the
259
voluntary associational inquiry as disjunctive tests.
The court’s use
of the word “or” in the plain language of the decision supports this
260
interpretation.
The Ninth Circuit stated that “‘a particular social
group’ is one united by a voluntary association, including a former
association, or by an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to
the identities or consciences of its members that members either
261
cannot or should not be required to change it.”
In addition, the UN’s refugee agency has endorsed the Ninth
Circuit approach.
In recently released guidelines on the
interpretation of the “membership in a particular social group”
category, UNHCR has suggested that under the Refugee Convention,
social groups may consist of persons sharing an immutable trait or of
262
persons sharing mutable, but societally recognized characteristics.
Acknowledging that “analyses under the two approaches may
frequently converge” when persons targeted because of an immutable
trait are also perceived as social groups within their particular
societies, the guidelines suggest that the Refugee Convention does
263
not require that the analysis be conflated.
In fact, the guidelines
264
explain that “at times the approaches may reach different results”
and a social group may exist even if its members do not share an
265
immutable characteristic.

259

See, e.g., Chisholm, supra note 124, at 442 (noting that the “court presented a
compromise definition of particular social group”); James H. Martin, The Ninth
Circuit’s Review of Administrative Questions of Law in the Immigration Context: How the
Court in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS Ignored Chevron and Failed to Bring Harmony to
“Particular Social Group” Analysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 159, 180 (2001) (stating that
“under the new Ninth Circuit definition of ‘particular social group,’ whether
homosexuality is found volitional or immutable, a group that has been defined in
terms of the sexual orientation or identity of its members will likely be a legally
cognizable ‘particular social group’”).
260
See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1084.
261
Id. at 1093.
262
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a Particular
Social Group” within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 ¶¶ 10-12
(2002) [hereinafter “2002 UN Social Group Guidelines”]. UNHCR proposes the
following definition:
A particular social group is a group of persons who share a common
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are
perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one
which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to
identity, conscience of the exercise of one’s human rights.
Id. at ¶ 11.
263
Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11.
264
Id.
265
Id. at ¶ 13.
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Unlike the approach advocated by UNHCR, the INS’s proposed
convergence of the Ninth Circuit’s disjunctive tests into a two-prong
analysis makes the “membership in a particular social group”
category the most difficult of the five grounds for which a person can
266
seek asylum.
As renowned international refugee law scholar Atle
Grahl-Madsen has noted, the categories of persecution in the
Refugee Convention’s definition of refugee can be divided into two
groups—those that represent characteristics beyond a person’s
267
control and those that represent voluntary characteristics.
In other
words, an applicant can establish asylum based on persecution
because of an immutable characteristic (as in the case of race,
268
nationality, and “in certain respects” religion ), or based on
persecution because of a voluntary, defining characteristic akin to the
voluntary associational test discussed in Hernandez-Montiel (as in the
269
case of political opinion).
Grahl-Madsen considered “membership
in a particular social group” to belong in the former “immutable”
270
while some jurisdictions have suggested that “social
category;
271
groups” may reflect only voluntary conduct or associational status.
Because of its proposed conjunctive test, the rule suggests that to
establish “membership in a particular social group,” an applicant
must establish both. Thus, persecution on account of an immutable
characteristic, particularly when that characteristic is gender, may not
qualify a persecuted person as a refugee under either classification of
272
protected status identified by Grahl-Madsen.
Consistent with the

266

The higher burden enacted by the rule is contrary to the INS’s earlier position
that improving the analysis of gender-based claims did not warrant altering the
current framework. See INS Guidelines, supra note 32, at 9.
267
ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 217
(1966).
268
Id.
269
Although the BIA in In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232-33 (B.I.A. 1985),
interpreted race, nationality, religion, and political opinion as immutable
characteristics, this Comment regards political activity as more appropriately
evaluated under the voluntary associational test. For the purpose of this argument,
however, the distinction is irrelevant because, unlike the social group category test
proposed by the rule, in any of the other four categories, the applicant only has to
establish persecution based on an immutable characteristic or based on a voluntary
association, not both.
270
GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 267
271
See Chisholm, supra note 124, at 440 (describing the approach of the First and
Second Circuits).
272
See Chisholm, supra note 124, at 450 (characterizing as uncertain whether “a
group defined solely by ‘sex’ or ‘gender’ will be cognizable (for example, women in
Afghanistan)”); see also Thiele, supra note 107, at 229 (noting that “[t]o date there
has been no case in which sex or gender on its own has been sufficient to establish
membership in a particular social group”).
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paradox faced by victims of gender-persecution, the conjunctive
approach leaves women stranded, their claims incompatible with any
273
of the categories of protection afforded to persons by refugee law.
For example, because of the discretion vested in judges to
consider the other factors, it is questionable whether the outcome of
Rodi Alvarado’s case before the BIA would be any different under the
274
proposed rule.
Even if Rodi Alvarado’s claimed group,
“Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live
275
under male domination,”
could meet the immutability
requirement, the additional factors could provide a basis for an
immigration judge to reach the same appalling result. In fact, a
judge could find that Rodi Alvarado’s claimed social group does not
meet several of the listed factors.
First, a judge could find that members of the group are not
closely affiliated with each other because women experience the
persecution individually and may not view their opposition to abuse
by their male companions as placing them in a larger societal
276
group.
Second, the BIA could view the group as not driven by a
common motive or interest if it deems each member’s objection to
the violence as a concern for her personal autonomy and safety,
rather than as an interest in the larger social problem of male
domination and abuse. The “common motive or interest” thus comes
close to requiring that members of a social group espouse a shared
political opinion—a suggestion that not only imposes a double
burden on certain applicants to meet standards embodied in more

273

UNHCR specifically rejects this possibility, noting that “sex can properly be
within the ambit of the social group category, with women being a clear example of a
social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are
frequently treated differently to men.” 2002 UN Social Group Guidelines, supra note
262, at ¶ 12.
274
It may not be too cynical to suggest, however, that the extensive media and
scholarly attention criticizing the R-A- outcome and anticipating its rehearing under
the new rule, see supra note 107, may contribute to a different outcome if the case is
finally reevaluated after publication of the finalized rule.
275
In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 911 (B.I.A. 1999).
276
See, e.g., id. at 918 (“The respondent has neither shown that the victims of
spouse abuse view themselves as members of this group, nor, most importantly, that
their male oppressors see their victimized companions as part of this group.”). In
the context of rape, Rumna Chowdhury, has argued “[t]he consequence of rape is to
make a woman feel as if she is deviant, her experience is anomalous, and she is alone
when, in fact, millions of women are raped. The private character of rape
contributes to the division of women, so that they do not recognize themselves as a
class and the effects of ‘individual’ crimes are minimized.” Chowdhury, supra note
61, at 120.
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than one asylum ground, but also unfairly suggests that women’s
objection to their personal domination at the hands of men is
277
inconsequential unless they champion the rights of all women.
Third, a judge could find that the group is not viewed as a societal
faction or otherwise recognized segment of the population if the
persecution of women is so rampant in a society that a judge deems
278
abused women too numerous to constitute a discrete group.
Similarly, a judge could find that oppressed women are not set apart
for distinct treatment from other members of society because the
violence directed at women as a class may be viewed from a culturally
elitist perspective as a collateral consequence of generally poor
country conditions rather than as human rights violations worthy of
279
an international response.
This is a substantial possibility
considering the emphasis on discretely defined social groups that
280
transcend country-wide strife in asylum law precedents.
281
For example, in Fatin v. INS, the Third Circuit stated that an
Iranian woman did not establish persecution on account of a
particular social group because, in the court’s view, her persecution

277

This notion governed the BIA’s rejection of Alvarado’s political opinion claim
in the R-A- case, in which the BIA reasoned that Alvarado’s objection to her
husband’s domination must fail “unless one assumes the common human desire not
to be harmed or abused is itself a political opinion.” In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 915.
For a criticism of society’s conception of women’s human rights as something
extraordinary and therefore requiring deliberate recognition within the human
rights paradigm, see Wolf, infra note 308.
278
See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that “the attributes
of a particular social group must be recognizable and discrete” and “broadly-based
characteristics such as youth and gender” are not particularized enough).
279
See, e.g., the cases rejecting Iranian women’s asylum claims based on the
pandemic nature of the country’s general mistreatment of women. Fatin v. INS, 12
F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993) (denying asylum based on the fact that the applicant’s
objection to repressive social norms was made applicable to all women in Iran);
Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that applicant objecting to
Iran’s repressive dress codes for women was ineligible for asylum because she “merely
has established that [she] faces a possibility of prosecution for an act deemed
criminal in Iranian society, which is made applicable to all [women] in that
country.”) (citation omitted); see also Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting an asylum claim in the case of a woman of Indian descent raped by ethnic
Fijians by reasoning that “general claims of broader ethnic tension across Fijian
society also do not establish statutory persecution”); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664
(2d Cir. 1991) (stating that while the court could not “discount the physical and
emotional pain that has been wantonly inflicted” on the numerous Salvadoran
women raped by Guerillas, the applicant failed to “demonstrate[ ] that she is more
likely to be persecuted than any other young woman”).
280
For a discussion of the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits’ restrictive
interpretations of social groups defined by gender, see Thiele, supra note 107, at 22432.
281
12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
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was indistinguishable from the generalized restrictions imposed on
282
the entire population of Iranian women.
Particularly in an antiimmigration climate, which arguably describes the United States after
283
September 11th, asylum judges may follow the reasoning of Fatin
and view social groups reflective of broad oppression in foreign
countries skeptically even if claimants otherwise meet the elements
284
required for refugee status.
In conclusion, under the proposed INS rule, whether gender by
itself may actually be considered a “social group” without reference to
the group’s other defining characteristics remains unfortunately
285
unclear.
The discretionary factors that allow immigration judges to
consider whether a group defined by gender has sufficient societal
significance can easily negate the impact of the INS’s declaration that
gender is an immutable trait which may constitute a particular social
286
This is extremely problematic in light of the continued
group.
breadth of human rights abuses perpetrated against entire societies
287
of women and by the UN’s position that persecution based on
288
Not only does the rule insert
gender warrants refugee protection.
new hurdles into the asylum process for victims of gender
persecution, it adds to a history of piecemeal efforts, such as the 1995
INS Guidelines and the Kasinga decision, which have failed to
revolutionize the treatment of gender-persecution under the
289
statute. In short, the rule’s flaws indicate a problem larger than the
R-A- decision: they demonstrate a fundamental gap in the asylum law
framework.
IV. THE GENDER PARADOX – A SIXTH CATEGORY IS NEEDED
Throughout the past decade, refugee activists and immigration
lawyers have advocated for greater protection for victims of gender

282

See Thiele, supra note 107, at 225 (citing Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1243 n.12).
See generally Carolyn S. Walker, Global Backlash of Afghan Refugees: When is
Enough, Enough?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 535 (2002); Tsiwen Law, Enrique Rosario
Special Reports: A Changing America – The Immigration Backlash, 23 PA. LAW. 50
(Nov./Dec. 2001).
284
For a discussion of how U.S. immigration policy changes in response to shifts
in political opinion, see Michael J. McBride, The Evolution of US Immigration and
Refugee Policy: Public Opinion, Domestic Politics and UNHCR, (Working Paper No. 3), at
http://www.unhcr.org.
285
See Chisholm, supra note 124, at 450.
286
See supra notes 276-82 and accompanying text.
287
See Swiss, supra note 61; Chowdhury, supra note 61; see also Amnesty
International, supra note 63.
288
See 2002 UN Social Group Guidelines, supra note 262, at ¶ 12.
289
See supra notes 91-98.
283

2002

COMMENT

249

persecution in asylum law largely through litigation and arguments
290
for regulatory reform—not through legislation. Because of the lack
of a gender category in the Refugee Convention’s definition of a
refugee, advocates representing the immediate interests of
persecuted women have had no other option but to frame their
291
asylum cases within one of the current categories.
However, in
fighting the necessary battle to ensure women’s protection within the
current framework, the focus of advocates may have eclipsed the
asylum system’s bigger flaw—the unjustified exclusion of victims of
gender-persecution from the Refugee Act’s categorical grounds for
asylum.
The patriarchal system firmly in place at the time of the Refugee
Convention’s enactment is largely responsible for women’s
definitional exclusion from the protection afforded to refugees by
292
the international community.
The inconsistent applications and
restrictive interpretations of the current asylum categories, however,
are a product of more than a limited definition; they may also be
attributable to society’s enduring patriarchal views of women and
293
their experiences.
Amending the refugee definition to include
gender persecution as an independent ground of asylum would not
only provide victims of gender-persecution a better legal framework,
it would send a definitive message to asylum adjudicators that
violence against women is internationally relevant.
Noted refugee scholar Deborah Anker has argued that adding a
separate category of gender-based persecution to the asylum
framework would be futile because the historical exclusion of women
from asylum protection is the result of “incomplete and gendered
294
interpretation of refugee law.”
According to Anker, “[s]imply

290

See Joan Fitzpatrick, The Gender Dimension of U.S. Immigration Policy, 9 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 23, 48 (1997) (noting that “advances in gender-based asylum doctrine have
come from approaching a presidential administration that is sensitive to ‘gender-gap’
politics and adjudicators who can reasonably be expected to respond favorably to
evolving international refugee standards”).
291
See Brashear Tiede, supra note 33, at 21 (“generally, gender-based asylum
claims rely on the theories of membership in a social group or political opinion”).
292
For discussions of how women have been excluded from participation in the
development of human rights law, see Butegwa, supra note 248 and HernándezTruyol, supra note 248.
293
See Daliah Setareh, Women Escaping Genital Mutilation — Seeking Asylum in the
United States, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 123 (1995) (arguing that the failure to
incorporate gender-related claims within the current definitions can be attributed to
“human rights law and discourse—that privileges male-dominated public activities
over the activities of women which take place largely in the private sphere”).
294
Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133, 139 (2002).

250

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:207

adding gender or sex to the enumerated grounds of persecution
295
would not solve this problem.”
In spite of this prediction, Anker
296
has an optimistic view of modern refugee law, specifically of its
capacity to “take an integrative perspective on women’s rights” within
297
the current framework.
While some strides have been made in recognizing women’s
298
rights within asylum law, Anker’s analysis underestimates the effect
an amendment to the Refugee Act could have in combating the
gender paradox that remains. A category of gender-persecution
would afford persecuted women an opportunity to avoid traditional
definitional barriers, such as the conception of “social group” as
discretely defined, which in spite of Anker’s optimism, persists as a
299
barrier for women.
In addition, amending the definition would
likely have a psychological impact on asylum adjudicators as well; it
would communicate the seriousness of their obligation to look
beneath the surface and analyze the motive for persecution in
300
women’s claims.
Most importantly, a separate category would
resolve the forced reliance on the “social group” category for the
assertion of two distinct kinds of gender-based claims, which poses
both substantive and conceptual problems.
The “social group” category must encompass claims in which the
persecution at issue “is on account of” the woman’s immutable
characteristic of gender, essentially gender-motivated crimes, such as
FGM and rape where the woman is selected for violence precisely
301
because of her gender.
In addition, this ground must also serve as
the basis for claims where women are persecuted because of
particular actions or beliefs, such as feminist activism or transgressing

295

Id.
See id. at 133 (noting “[i]nternational refugee law is coming of age”).
297
See id. at 139.
298
See, e.g., 2002 UN Gender Guidelines, supra note 12.
299
See Thiele, supra note 107, at 224-32.
300
Courts’ thorough analysis of VAWA claims exemplifies the impact that
statutory recognition of gender-bias can have on the motive analysis. For a discussion
of gender-bias determinations in VAWA cases, see Goldscheid & Kaufman, supra note
138, at 273-274, 276. The authors note that nearly all courts evaluating VAWA
claims, prior to the Supreme Court’s dissolution of the private right of action,
reasoned that rape, domestic violence, sexual assault, or other unwanted sexual
conduct revealed gender-motivation. Id.
301
See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996). Although the BIA decided
the case based on a social group theory, the decision’s analysis suggested that there
was no need to consider Kasinga’s tribe as a social group because the primary
motivation for FGM is to suppress the victim because she is a woman. See supra note
187 and accompanying text. Thus, Kasinga’s membership in the tribe was merely the
context in which her persecution as a woman took place.
296
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302

social mores.
The “membership in a particular social group” and
“political opinion” categories may appropriately apply to women’s
claims when the motivation for persecution is specific to the woman’s
conduct, not status, and may therefore meet adjudicators’
303
requirements that the social group be discretely defined.
However,
to treat women’s claims asserting persecution on account of their
gender under the same “social group” ground minimizes the
difference — as Andrea Binder puts it — between women being
persecuted “as women” and women suffering human rights abuses
304
“because they are women.”
While certain fortunate female asylum
applicants and their lawyers may continue to fit or creatively squeeze
claims into the current categories, Anker’s description of refugee law
as “integrative” will never be fully realized until gender-motivated
persecution is no longer an asylum paradox requiring refugee lawyers
to proceed with the utmost imagination.
Furthermore, the many gender-based asylum cases in which
applicants have had to rely on the “political opinion” ground to
establish cognizable persecution undermines the principle that
victimizing women on account of their gender is a violation of human
305
rights.
Although this ground of seeking asylum has proved
successful for some victims of gender persecution who could not
otherwise establish asylum, its suggestion that objection to this
treatment is merely a “political belief” shared by a faction is not in
accordance with the international community’s condemnation of
306
violence against women as a violation of human rights.
While a
woman’s belief in equality may in a few narrow circumstances
307
appropriately be viewed as a political opinion, a woman’s general
objection to torture and to the denial of basic human rights should
308
not be considered political, nor extraordinary.

302

See 1991 UN Gender Guidelines, supra note 64, at 16.
See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that social
group “does not encompass every broadly defined segment of a population”).
304
Binder, supra note 58, at 167-68.
305
The BIA’s rejection of Alvarado’s political opinion claim in R-A- reveals a
larger theoretical weakness of this theory of asylum for victims of gender persecution.
The BIA rejected Alvarado’s asserted political opinion as essentially a belief that men
should not dominate women, noting, “unless one assumes that the common human
desire not to be harmed or abused is itself a political opinion.” In re R-A-, 22 I. & N.
Dec. 906, 915 (B.I.A. 1999).
306
See CEDAW, supra note 68.
307
For examples of women transgressing social mores, see 1991 UN Gender
Guidelines, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
308
See generally Naomi Wolf, “Women Are Like Cold Mutton”: Power, Humiliation, and
a New Definition of Human Rights, WOMEN’S VOICES, WOMEN’S RIGHTS 93, 98-100
(Alison Jefries ed., 1996) (discussing human rights activists’ use of the axiom
303
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The contradictory conception of gender persecution claims by
asylum adjudicators as either too broad or too narrow to warrant
refugee status, complicates the burden on women to squeeze distinct
types of claims within the available grounds of asylum. On one end
309
310
of the spectrum are cases like Fatin, and Safie v. INS, which
denied asylum to applicants based on a conception of “social groups”
as discretely defined and of the gender oppression in Iran as too
311
widespread for the purposes of asylum.
In contrast, in cases like RA-, judges have viewed gender violence as too private and
particularized to constitute persecution based on the characteristics
312
of a social group that transcend the individual victim.
The “R-Arule” fits within the latter vision of gender persecution because of its
313
requirement that the abuse be societally relevant.
These
conflicting restrictions on gender-based asylum claims have created a
troubling paradox: a tension between competing demands on
gender-based claims which leaves women with only narrow
314
opportunities to gain refuge.
315
Furthermore, the paradox faced by women is unique.
Concern over the size of the group sharing the protected
characteristic has generally not been a barrier for persons persecuted
316
on account of their race or religion. In fact, widespread oppression

“women’s rights are human rights” as a sad commentary on the necessity of
reminding the world that women are human).
309
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
310
25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting as overbroad the claim that “Iranian
women, by virtue of their innate characteristics (their sex) and the harsh restrictions
placed upon them” had suffered persecution on account of a protected
characteristic).
311
See id; see also Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d 1575.
The statutory words ‘particular’ and ‘social’ which modify ‘group,’
indicate that the term does not encompass every broadly defined
segment of a population . . . [i]nstead, the phrase ‘particular social
group’ implies a collection of people closely affiliated with each other,
who are actuated by some common impulse or interest. Of central
concern is the existence of a voluntary associational relationship
among the purported members, which imparts some common
characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that
discrete social group.
Id.
312
See supra notes 149 and accompanying text.
313
See supra notes 149-97.
314
See supra notes 310-13.
315
See Thiele, supra note 107, at 227 (arguing that the rejection of women’s
asylum claims when oppression is widespread “places a greater burden on women
than on claimants seeking asylum on account of the other categories”).
316
See id; see also Anjana Bahl, Home is Where the Brute Lives: Asylum Law and GenderBased Claims of Persecution, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 33 (1997) (arguing that the size
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— specifically the genocide perpetrated against Jews — was precisely
the kind of persecution that compelled the creation of the Refugee
317
Convention.
It is true that persecution based on race and religion
has generally tended to affect discrete religious and ethnic
minorities, groups that are significantly smaller in scale than the
318
general category of women.
The asylum statute, however, does not
include the specific names of each ethnic or religious group as a
319
Instead, it protects all of
protected class in the asylum statute.
these groups as a whole, linking them through the general reason for
their persecution, for example, their race or religion, without regard
to the number of persons afflicted collectively within each category
320
of persecution.
Similarly, while women from different cultures may experience
gender-persecution differently, they are linked by the common
reason for their persecution: their sex.
The frequency of a
motivation — that occurs globally and cross-culturally — for
persecuting certain refugees should not exclude an applicant from
321
gaining asylum.
While women collectively constitute a broad
category of persons, gender as a descriptive characteristic of motive is
322
no broader than race or religion. Accordingly, Congress should act
323
to honor the United States’ international obligation to protect all

of a social group should not be a barrier to asylum because “like the other
enumerated categories, [the social group category] is simply a tool . . . to indicate the
premise and reasons for which the individual is being persecuted”).
317
See Binder, supra note 58.
318
Walter Kälin, Non-State Agents of Persecution and The Inability Of the State to Protect,
15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 415 (2000) (arguing that “[t]he nature of persecution is
changing, as evidenced by the increasing frequency of persecution of minorities by
their neighbors belonging to the majority, ethnic cleansing or even genocide carried
out by militias, terrorist attacks and killings by groups claiming to fight in the name
of a religious creed, or attacks on the civilian population by insurgent groups
fighting for independence”).
319
See INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
320
See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 267, at 213. In dated language, Grahl-Madsen
noted:
The origin of the phrase makes it quite clear that the word ‘race’ in the
present context denotes not only the major ethnic groups, such as
Europeans (‘the white race’), Africans (‘the black race’), Mongols
(‘the yellow race’), Red Indians, &c., [sic] but also, groups which are
less easily differentiated, such as Jews, gypsies, &c. [sic] In the present
context the word ‘race’ is therefore referring to social prejudice rather
than to a more or less scientific division of mankind.
Id.
321
See id.
322
See generally Goldscheid, supra note 181.
323
Anker, supra note 294, at 135-36 (noting that “refugee law is international law,
grounded in an international treaty”).
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324

refugees by amending the asylum statute.
Congress did not hesitate to expand the refugee definition
through legislation when it conflicted with values important to
Congress in the past. For example, reproductive politics galvanized
conservative members of Congress to amend the Refugee Act in 1996
to include forced sterilization and coercive family planning within the
325
definition of persecution.
Having recognized the occurrence of
gender apartheid in Afghanistan — a country to whom the United
326
States has pledged support for women rebuilding their lives — it is
a fitting moment for Congress to fully integrate women’s experiences
within refugee law. To amend the Refugee Act would not only signal
a shift in the paradoxical history of women’s gender-based asylum
claims, it would achieve an overdue recognition that “women do have
a legitimate claim to human rights and fundamental freedoms due
327
them as women.”
The primary argument raised against amending the Refugee Act
to add a gender category is the concern that it would open the
floodgates to asylum claims and inundate the United States with
328
refugees.
The historical and present reality of women’s limited

324

For scholarly work in favor of amending the definition of refugee to include
gender as an independent category, see Marian Kennady, Note, Gender-Related
Persecution and the Adjudication of Asylum Claims: Is a Sixth Category Needed?, 12 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 317 (1998); Todd Stewart Schenk, Note, A Proposal to Improve the Treatment of
Women in Asylum Law: Adding a “Gender” Category to the International Definition of
“Refugee”, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 301 (1994).
325
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 290, at 48 (criticizing the passage of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 in response to
China’s coercive reproductive practices for its male-centric motives). The author
notes that this lone recent “legislative expansion” of the Refugee definition was the
product “of anti-abortion politics.” Id. Fitzpatrick argues that “[w]hile forced
abortion is clearly a form of gender-specific violence, forced sterilization is not and
men are likely to predominate among asylum claimants relying upon this expanded
definition.” Id.
326
In the fall of 2001, the Bush Administration gave $600,000 to a fund for
Afghan women and the President later said in his State of the Union Address that
“‘America will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity,’
including ‘respect for women.’” Derrick Z. Jackson, Bush Shaky on Women’s Rights,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2002, at A17.
327
See Butegwa, supra note 248, at 31 (discussing international law’s failure to
perceive women as having human rights “unique to their gender”).
328
Many scholars have already addressed and rejected this unsubstantiated fear.
See Binder, supra note 58, at 192 (calling the floodgates argument “unpersuasive and
misplaced”); David L. Neal, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution
as Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 241 n.192 (1988) (stating
the floodgate arguments is more about fear than reality); see also Peter C. Godfrey,
Note, Defining the Social Group in Asylum Proceedings: The Expansion of the Social Group to
Include a Broader Class of Refugees, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 257 (1994).
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means to escape from persecution, however, does not support this
329
fear. The experience of countries such as Canada are instructive; it
did not experience a surge in refugees after recognizing persecution
based on gender without regard to other social group
330
characteristics.
In addition, as this critique of the “R-A- rule” has
addressed, the asylum framework already provides substantial
331
safeguards against a potential flood of refugees.
The burden of
presenting sufficient evidence of a persecutor’s motive and the
requirement that a country be unable or unwilling to protect an
applicant from persecution, remain substantial hurdles for any
332
asylum applicant.
V. CONCLUSION
Asylum law’s gender paradox evolved out of a 50-year-old treaty
that ignored the needs of women and the realities of their
333
experience.
The paradox has grown under adjudication reflecting
enduring stereotypes about why women are tortured and abused.
The assumptions underlying the proposed “R-A- rule” are a product
334
of the paradox as well.
Until a fundamental change is made to the
asylum framework, a change that will send a definitive message to
asylum adjudicators that they must treat gender bias as they do other
forms of persecution, the inconsistencies will likely continue without
restraint. While Anker is right that it may be impossible to
completely prevent stereotypes of women’s experiences from
335
permeating asylum claims, under an amended Refugee Act, the
paradoxical treatment of women’s persecution would no longer be
exacerbated by limited definitions and their concomitant messages
about the relevancy of women’s experiences.
Until then, the essence of the gender paradox may be larger
than competing legal demands placed on gender-based claims. The

329

See Paula Abrams, Population Politics: Reproductive Rights and U.S. Asylum Policy,
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 881, 904 (2000) (noting that women often “lack the economic
independence to escape oppressive conditions”).
330
See Audrey Macklin, Cross Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United
States, Canadian, and Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
25, 34 (1998) (arguing that “it appears safe to assert” that Canada’s recognition of
persecution on account of gender without regard to other social group
characteristics “did not lead to a ‘flood’ of women seeking asylum in Canada in terms
of absolute numbers”).
331
See supra PART III.B.
332
See id.
333
See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
334
See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
335
See Anker, supra notes 294-97.
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true irony may be that refugees who are some of the most tortured
and the most in need of protection may be turned away. While the
“R-A- rule” awaits action by the Bush Administration, Rodi Alvarado
336
continues to wait, as well.
She has now been in the United States
for seven years, cleaning houses, thinking about her two children
whom she was forced to leave with relatives in Guatemala, and waiting
to hear if she can remain within the safety of the country to which she
337
bravely escaped.
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